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The research was dedicated to the analysis of the interactions between political
processes and economic activities. Explicitly, the research focussed on the theoretical and
empirical study concerning the economic impact of political cycles and, especially, to
evaluate the relevance of European experiences for Romania.
The  analysis  was  focused  to  the  following  subjects:  to  overview  the  existent
literature  on  the  interactions  between  political  processes  and  economic  activities –
political implications of the economic status (the so -called vote – popularity function),
and economic impact of the political behaviours – the political business cycles (section
1); to analyse specific features of the vote – popularity functions and the political business
cycles in the developed economies and, especially, in the European Union Countries, by
over viewing relevant empirical studies (section 2); to survey the literature concerning
models  and  empirical  evidences  of  the  interactions  between  political  processes  and
economic activity for the developing countries (section 3) and for the East European
Candidate  Countries  (section  4);  to  analyse  the  interactions  between  the  political
processes  and  the  economic  dynamics  in  Romania –  macroeconomic  signals  of  the
political business cycles, and estimation of regional vote -popularity function (section 5);
to discuss the consequences of political business cycles for the processes of transition and
the European integration (section 6).
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Economic Impact of Political Cycles – The Relevance of European
Experiences for Romania
1. Defining the Interactions between Political Processes and Economic Activity
The political business cycle can be seen as a business cycle that results (a) from
the manipulation of policy tools (fiscal policy, monetary policy) by incumbent politicians
in  hope  to  stimulating  the  economy  just  prior  to  an  election  and  thereby  greatly
improving their own and their party's re-election chances or (b) from the competition
amongst political parties with the different ideologies. On that account, the theory of
political  business  cycle  investigates  the  relationship  between  political  cycles  and
economic  cycles,  namely  how  the  timing  of  elections,  the  ideological  orientation  of
governments  and  the  nature  of  competition  amongst  political  parties  influence
unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and the use of various monetary and fiscal
policy instruments.
The two main types of the political business cycles are: election cycles generated
by  governments  manipulating  the  economy  to  maximise  re -election  chances
(opportunistic  cycles  models),  and partisan  cycles  generated  by  the  change  of
governments  pursuing  different  goals  (Alesina,  Roubini  and  Cohen,  1997).  Also,  in
literature, models based on the syntheses between opportunistic and partisan political
behaviour have been build (Fray & Schneider, 1978). Further on, to set out from the
opportunistic-ideological  spectrum  of  political  motivation,  the  models  of  the  political
business  cycles  can  be  classified  according  to  the  expectations  that  individuals  are
assumed to hold.
This classification allows us to identify four variants in the political business cycle
literature  (Garratt  &  Jackson,  1996,  and  Nowaihi  &  Garratt,  1998):  (i)  the  pure
opportunistic  political  business cycle;  (ii)  the  strong  partisan  theory;  (iii)  the  rational
opportunistic political business cycle, and (iv) the weak (rational) partisan theory (Table
1)
In the famous terms of Anthony Downs (1957, p.28), parties "formulate p olicies
in  order  to  win  elections,  rather  than  win  elections  in  order  to  formulate  policies".
Inspired  by  Niccolo  Machiavelli  (1469-1527),  and  Anthony  Downs  (1957),  the pure
(traditional) opportunistic political business cycle model ) is associated with the work of
Nordhaus  (1975).  The  term  ‘pure’  is  a  consequence  of  Nordhaus’s  assumption  that
political parties are interested not in satisfying ideological goals but only in manipulating
the economy to win elections. The election period is taken to be of fixed  length so that
there are periodic elections. The economy is described by the Phillips curve relationship
between inflation and unemployment, such that a greater trade -off in the long run than in
the short-run exists. Nordhaus’s model was meant to show tha t if voting was based on
economic performance in the recent past and if expectations of inflation were backward -
looking, an opportunistic incumbent who controlled monetary policy would find optimal
to induce an inflation-unemployment cycle corresponding to the length of his term, with a
boom just before an election and a recession afterwards (Paldam, 1997 and Nannestad
and Paldam, 1997, 1999).5
The  opportunistic  political  business  cycle  approach  omitted  an  ideological
dimension from the utility function of politicians. The models of partisan cycles stress
that  the  policies  of  the  parties  are  influenced  by  party  ideologies,  so  that  different
governments  systematically  pursue  different  goals  and  hence  different  policies.  And
different  policies  lead  to  different  outcomes  (Nannestad  and  Paldam,  1999).  Partisan
theory has categorised political parties as being of the Left or Right (Hibbs, 1977). In
order to defend the workers' interests, the Left-wing party will prioritise unemployment
over inflation and undertake monetary and fiscal policies, which promote growth and
welfare. While defending the entrepreneurs' interests, the Right -wing party will prioritise
inflation over unemployment. Monetary and fiscal policy will be tighter than under a
Left-wing  party  (Nowaihi  and  Garratt,  1998).  Consequently,  unemployment  is
permanently lower, and growth and inflation are permanently higher with the Left -wing
party in office than with Right-wing governments (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997).
Table 1: The typology of the political business cycles
The behaviour of electors is based on:
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The rational  opportunistic  political  business  cycles  models   (Cukierman  and
Meltzer,  1986,  Rogoff  and  Sibert,  1988,  Rogoff,  1990,  Persson  and  Tabellini,  1990)
combine the classical hypothesis of the opportunistic behaviour of po licymakers with the
ideas of competence and asymmetric information. Under certain assumptions about the
rational  behaviour  of  voters,  these  models  imply  multiyear  cycle  in  growth  and
unemployment, but this cycle is not regular. Inflation starts to increase  prior to an election
and remains high few quarters afterwards, falling afterwards (same as for the traditional
opportunistic models), but the effects of political business cycle are smaller and shorter -
lived. The vote share of the incumbent is increasing in past growth and decreasing in past
unemployment,  and  the  specific  pattern  of  this  relationship  depends  on  voters'
information.
The model of the rational partisan theory is primarily associated with the works
of Alesina (Alesina, 1987). In rational partisan theory, different voters have different
preferences over inflation and unemployment (like in traditional partisan theory), but here
they vote for the party that delivers the highest expected utility. Empirical implications of
these  behaviours  are:  short-run  partisan  effects  after  elections –  unemployment6
temporarily lower than normal and growth temporarily higher than normal for about two
years after an electoral victory of the left; the opposite outcome after an electoral victory
of the right; unemployment and growth return to their natural rates in the second part with
both types of government; deviation of growth and unemployment from natural rates is
correlated with the amount of electoral surprise; inflation is permanently higher when the
left is in office relative to when the right is in office.
Another  general  issue  concerns  the possibility  of  joining  partisan  and
opportunistic  models.  The  result  is  the  so-called context-dependent  models.  In  these
models the extent to which policy makers’ control s over macroeconomic outcomes or
policies can vary significantly depending on the specific circumstance. Thus, in their
model, Fray and Schneider (1978) Frey and Schneider attempt to outline a popularity
function  and  a  policy  function.  The  political  popula rity  function  expresses  a  party's
support as a function of the unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates, while
the latter embodies the responsive ideological preferences of the incumbent government.
They  suggest  that  partisan  politicians,  when  in office,  become  opportunistic  when
elections approach if they are relatively unpopular – if government's actual popularity is
in  excess  of  the  critical  popularity  then  government  holds  a  popularity  surplus;  if
government's  popularity  falls  short  of  the  critical  level  then  government  holds  a
popularity deficit; a popularity surplus motivates government to act ideologically while a
popularity deficit motivates them to act opportunistically. Namely, if popularity is low,
then economic variables are manipulated to increase the chances of re-election, whereas
with high popularity the government follows its supporters' and own ideology by being
responsive. Therefore, Frey and Schneider's model emphasises utility maximising instead
of vote-maximising governments. Popularity is sought so that the ideological programme
can be followed.
From a similar approach Schultz (1995) notes that political manipulation on the
macro economy can be very costly, and the incumbent's incentives to manipulate the
economy  can  vary  from elections  to  elections  contingent  upon  their  political  needs.
According  to  Fray  and  Schneider  (1978),  Schultz  argues  that  the  incumbent  will  not
necessarily manipulate the economy if his expected probability of winning next election
is relatively high. This idea has confirmed too, by Price (1998) studies.
2. Empirical studies concerning the political business cycles in the European Union
Countries
2.1. The methodology
Empirical implications of different models of political business cycles are carried
out  in  economic  literature  starting  with  the  different  consequences  of  each  model.
Following the schema lay out by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997):
a) If the opportunistic traditional models of the political business cycles are correct, then
we expect:
- Expansion in the year or two before the elections; Gross National Product growth
above normal, unemployment below normal in the election year;
- Inflation begins to increase immediately before or immediately after the election;7
- Recession (or downturn) after the election, with gradual reduction of inflation;
- No differences in policies and outcomes between different governments;
- Incumbents reappointed when growth is high and unemployment low in election
years.
b) If the rational opportunistic models of the political business cycles are correct, then we
expect:
- Short run manipulations of policy instruments immediately before elections: increase
in deficits, inflation, and money growth in the two-three quarters before each election;
- Tightening of monetary and fiscal policies after elections;
- No systematic, multi-years effects on growth and unemployment except for, possibly,
some minor effects immediately before the election;
- Incumbents  reappointed  when  growth  is  high  and  unemployment  low  in  election
years.
c) If the traditional partisan model of the political business cycles is correct, then we
expect:
- Growth permanently higher, unemployment permanently lowers when the left is in
office;
- Inflation permanently higher during the tenure in office of lef t-wing governments
than with right-wing governments.
d)  If  the rational  partisan  model  of  the  political  business  cycles  is  correct,  then  we
expect:
- Short-run  partisan  effects  after  elections:  unemployment  temporarily  lower  than
normal  and  growth  temporarily  higher  than  normal  for  about  two  years  after  an
electoral victory of the left; the opposite outcome after an electoral victory of the
right; unemployment and growth return to their natural rates in the second part of both
right and left-wing terms of office;
- Deviation  of  growth  and  unemployment  from  natural  rates  is  correlated  with  the
amount of electoral surprise;
- Inflation permanently higher when the left is in office relative to when the right is in
office.
To  test  the  existence  of  the  political  business cycles,  generally  is  running  the
following regression model (Alesina and Roubini, 1990, 1992):
t t 1 n n t n 2 t 2 1 t 1 0 t ε PDUM a y a y a y a a y             (1)
In the equation (1), yt is the stacked vector of time-series data on output growth,
unemployment  or inflation,  and  PDUM  is  a  political  dummy  that  captures  the
implications of the different theories.
For example, in order to test the Nordhaus model on quarterly data, Alesina and
Roubini (1990, 1992), Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) and Alesina, Roubin i, and
Cohen  (1997)  include  in  their  models  a  PDUM  dummy  variable  equalling  1  in  the
election quarter and in the T-1 quarters before the election, and 0 otherwise (where T may
equal 4, 6, or 8). As the measure of economic activity they consider the year -over-year
growth  rate  of  Gross  National  Product  or  an  unemployment  measure  (the  exact
specification depending on the model and data set).
In  accord  with  a  same  model,  Alt  (1985)  finds  evidence  consistent  with  the
partisan  political  business  cycle  theory  looking  at  unemployment  in  twelve  OECD8
countries. Alesina and Roubini (1990, 1992), Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1992) found
evidence in favour of the rational partisan theory for a sample of OECD countries and no
evidence was found in developed economies outside the U.S. for Nordhaus style political
business cycles for unemployment or economic growth. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen
(1997) reject an opportunistic cycle in real activity for a sample of 18 OECD countries
over the period 1960-93. Because the partisan theory implies that inflation will be higher
under Democratic administrations, Cohen (1993) tests whether changing probabilities of
electing a Democrat, as derived by polling data before U.S. elections affect short - and
long-term interest rates. The post-electoral increase in inflation predicted by the Nordhaus
model receives support in some countries and not in others (Drazen, 2000).
2.2. Evidences of the political business cycles in the European Union Countries
In a series of three influential papers, Alesina and Roubini (1990, 1992), Alesina,
Cohen, Roubini (1991), Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) studied whether the dynamic
behaviour  of  Gross  National  Product  growth,  unemployment  and  inflation  is
systematically  affect  by  the  timing  of  elections  and  of  ch anges  of  governments.  The
sample  includes  the  period  1960  to  1987
1,  for  11  countries  from  European  Union
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden, United Kingdom) and 7 another OECD economies (Australia,  Canada, Japan,
New  Zealand,  Norway,  Switzerland,  and  the  United  States).  The  economic  data  are
quarterly observations on inflation (yearly rate of change of the consumer price index),
output  growth  (the  rate  of  change  of  real  gross  national  product,  or  gr oss  domestic
product), and unemployment. The political data are election dates, the dates of change of
governments, and the political orientation of various governments.
Their main results can be summarized as follows: (a) the political business cycles
hypothesis, as formulated in Nordhaus (1975) on output and unemployment is generally
rejected by the data (with the exception of Japan, they also reject the political business
model with endogenous timing of elections); (b) inflation tends to increase immedi ately
after elections, as a result of pre-electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies; (c)
there are a temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and a long -run
partisan differences in the inflation rate, in according with the rational partisan theory
(Alesina, 1987); (d) the mentioned studies didn't find evidence of permanent partisan
differences in output and unemployment.
To obtain these results, Alesina and Roubini (1990, 1992) ran the tests that are
based upon the assumption that output growth, unemployment and inflation are generated
by a covariance-stationary stochastic process. Therefore, they ran the panel regressions of
time-series cross-section data described by equation (1), where y t is the stacked vector of
time-series  data  on  output  growth,  unemployment  or  inflation,  PDUM  is  a  political
dummy that captures the implications of the different theories and the autoregressive
specification (n) is chosen using standard econometric techniques.
For the reason that the sample includes small open economies, in their models
Alesina  and  Roubini  (1990,  1992),  Alesina,  Cohen,  Roubini  (1991),  and  Alesina,
Roubini, Cohen (1997) take into consideration the high degree of interdependent between
1 In Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) the sample includes the time period 1960 – 1993.9
the economies. The effects of the world economy on domestic economies are captured by
add as a regressor in equation (1) a proxy for an OECD average of the same variable.
For  testing  the rational  partisan  theory,  the  authors  used  a  political  dummy
variable symbolised DRPTN, where DRPTN = +1 in the N quarters starting with that of a
change of government toward the right, DRPTN = -1 in the N quarters starting with that
of  a  change  of  government  toward  the  left,  and  DRPTN = 0  otherwise.  In  Alesina,
Roubini (1990, 1992) the best dimension of n (the degree of autoregressive process) for
the output has been find to 2 and the model is running for 15 countries from 18 OECD
economies  in  the  sample  (Japan and  Switzerland  are  not  included  since  they  had  no
political change in the sample; the Netherlands is not i ncluded and the authors didn't
suggest an explication). By using a fixed-effect model with constant slopes, the obtained
results are presented in Table 2
2.
Table 2: Rational Partisan Theory
 Dependent Variable: Rate of Growth of Output (Y)
Model 1 Model 2 Independent
variables Coefficient (t-statistics) Coefficient (t-statistics)
Constant 0.13 (0.55) -0.18 (-0.81)
Y(-1) 0.712 (28.1) 0.610 (17.27)
Y(-2) -0.062 (-2.55) -0.01 (-0.28)
YW 0.353 (11.82) 0.305 (9.35)
DRPT6(-1) -0.41 (-3.48) -0.62 (-4.42)
USA -0.45 (-1.49) 0.21 (0.81)
UK -0.63 (-2.08) -0.02 (-0.07)
Germany -0.36 (-1.19) 0.28 (1.09)
France -0.14 (-0.45) 0.49 (1.81)








Australia 0.03 (0.10) 0.007 (2.67)





In the previous table, Y is the rate of GNP growth in quarter t, YW is the world
growth  average,  N = 6,  and  the  remaining  regressors  are  country  dummies.  The  one -
2 Alesina A., Roubini N., 1992, Political Cycles in OECD Economies, in Rev iew of Economic Studies, 59,
p.67110
quarter lag in the political dummy is consistent with a reasonable interval between change
in regime and change of policy.
In Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) the model is running for all the 18 OECD
economies and the time period is 1960 – 1993. The founded results are similar to Alesina
A., Roubini N. (1990, and 1992).
According  to  Alesina  A.,  Roubini  N.  (1990,  p.13 -14  and  1992,  p.  670)  and
Alesina,  Roubini,  Cohen  (1997,  p.149-152),  the  political  dummy  variable  DRPT6  is
statistically significant and she has the correct sign. This means that:
A change in government to the right leads to a transitory fall in output
growth, and a change to the left leads to a transitory increase in output growth.
More precisely, about eighteen months after a change of regime toward the
right (left) the rate of growth of GNP is about 1.3% below (above) normal rate
(Alesina A., Roubini N., 1992, p.671).
The  regressions  with  DRPT4  and  DRPT8  yield  analogous  results  (these
regressions are explicitly presented only in Alesina, Roubini, Cohen, 1997, p.150 -151).
The same models are running by Alesina, Roubini (1990, 1992), Alesina, Cohen, Roubini
(1991), and Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) for unemployment and inflation.
In the authors' opinions, the results concerning the unemployment and the
inflation rate were accordingly to rational partisan theory of political business
cycles. For example, they find that about six quarters after a change of regime
toward the right (left) the unemployment rate is about 1.5 percentage point
above (below) normal (1992, p. 672-673). The effect in inflation rate is rather
permanent, than transitory (1992, p.673-676).
The second group of models is running only for a subset of countries that have a
more clearly identifiable left and right coalitions. In this model, the coefficients on the
political  dummy  variable  are  much  larger  in  absolute  value  and even  more  precisely
estimated.
Hibbs's partisan theory implies permanent differences in growth, unemployment
and inflation across governments. Thus, for testing the traditional partisan theory, the
authors ran the same regression models using the permanent partisan dummy variable
RADM. The political dummy variable symbolised RADM, is defined: RADM = +1 if a
right-wing government is in office (including the quarter of the change of government),
and  RADM = -1  if  a  left-wing  government  is  in  office  (including  the  quarter  of  the
change of government).
The obtained results demonstrate that in the traditional partisan model all the
coefficients on the political dummy are insignificant, even though with the right sign
(Alesina, Roubini, 1992, p.675). According to the authors' opinion, the test confirms th at
the effect of changes of governments on growth and unemployment are transitory (p.676).
By using other dummy, symbolised ADM, Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997) tried
to distinguish more finely the centre-right and centre-left governments from those more
clearly rightist and leftist (p.155). The ADM dummy variable includes the RADM values
for the right- and left-wing governments in office, and additionally, the following two
values: ADM = ½ if a centre-right government is in office (including the quarter of  the
change of government), and ADM = -½ if a centre-left government is in office (including
the quarter of the change of government). With this definition of the political variable, in
the growth regressions, the coefficients on the political dummy are in significant, even11
though with the expected sign. In the unemployment regressions, the coefficient on the
permanent partisan dummy (ADM) is significant at the 5 percent level. Despite of this
result, the authors reject the traditional partisan theory. This because in the first period of
an administration, the ADM variable overlaps with the DRPT variable so that the ADM
might  be capturing  the transitory  effects  (estimated  by  DRPT)  rather  than  permanent
effects. Another justification of their position is the f ollowing: because the unemployment
rate is highly persistent in most OECD countries, such effects from the first period of the
term might propagate through the second half even if the partisan effect is due only to the
original electoral surprise (according to the rational partisan theory).
In the authors' opinion the results obtained by running political models as the ones
described by equation (1) for the OECD panel data indirectly provide empirical support
for  the  inflation  bias  model  of  Kydland  and  Pre scott  (1977)  and  Barro  and  Gordon
(1983):
The regressions show that a permanent difference in inflation rate is associated
with temporary deviations of output and unemployment from trend; consistently
with  the  models  of  inflation  bias,  real  effects  occur  o nly  when  there  are
unexpected policy shocks, in this case as a result of electoral surprise (Alesina,
Roubini, 1990, p.19; 1992, p.676; Alesina, Roubini, Cohen, 1997, p.165).
For  testing  the  Nordhaus opportunistic  political  business  cycles,  usually  the
political dummy variable of equation (1) take the form: NRDN = 1 in the (N-1) quarters
preceding  an  election  and  in  the  election  quarter,  and  NRDN = 0  otherwise.  The
coefficients of NRDN, with N  {4, 6, 8}, are not significant in regressions concerning
growth and unemployment carried out by Alesina, Roubini (1990, 1992), Alesina, Cohen,
Roubini (1991), and Alesina, Roubini, Cohen (1997). Moreover, in the growth regression
the coefficient of the political dummy has the opposite sign from the theory predictio n.
That is, following the quoted papers, they aren't reasons for the opportunistic
behaviour of the policymakers in the OECD countries .
The  rational  model  of  the  opportunistic  political  business  cycles  (Rogoff  and
Sibert, 1988) implies that pre-electoral manipulation of monetary and fiscal policy (used
to signal the government competence) entails an increase of inflation immediately after
each election. A coefficient of the political dummy used in such model (NPOST = 1 in
the  N-1  quarters  following  an  election  and  in  the  election  quarter,  and  NRDN = 0
otherwise) is significant.
This  result  would  suggest  that around  election,  monetary  and  fiscal  policy
instruments might be manipulated, even though these policies do not seem to
affect real economic activity (Alesina, Roubini, Cohen, 1997, p.170)
The  Alesina  and  Roubini  (1990)  results  obtained  by  performing  country -by-
country  regression  model  of  the  rational  partisan  cycle  for  the  11  European  Union
Countries are presented in Table 3.
According to these analyses, in Denmark, Germany, and France, all the regression
on growth, unemployment and inflation show evidence favourable to the rational partisan
theory, although not all the coefficient on the political variables are significant at the
usual confidence level (1%, 5% or 10%) in every regression (Alesina and Roubini, 1992,
p.679). The results on the U.K. are greatly strengthened if the sample is restricted to the
post-fixed  rates  period.  In  other  countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland,  the
Netherlands, Sweden) the coefficients on the political variables exhibit the correct sign in12
either  the  growth  and/or  the  unemployment  regressions.  Italia  show  no  significant
coefficient in any regressions (Alesina and Roubini, 1992, p.680). No significant results
were found in the inflation regressions.
Table 3: Rational Partisan Theory
Dependent Variable (t- statistics in parentheses)
Output growth (Y) Unemployment (U) Inflation rate (π) Country
DRPT N(-J) (N,J) DRPT N(-J) (N,J) RADM(-I) (I)
Austria -1.207 (-1.389) (6,1) 0.181 (1.981) (4,1) 0.010 (-0.064) 1
Belgium -0.027 (-0.061) (8,2) 0.076 (1.569 (8,2) 0.243 (0.289) 5
Denmark -0.467 (-1.37) (4,2) 0.233 (2.835) (4,2) -0.457 (-2.92) 4
Finland -0.852 (-1.65) (8,2) -0.003 (-0.048) (8,2) 0.119 (-0.94) 5
France -0.802 (-1.390) (4.1) 0.150 (2.000) (6,1) -0.308 (-2.63) 1
Germany -0.699 (-2.418) (8.2) 0.120 (3.106) (6,1) -0.164 (-1.881) 2
Ireland -1.190 (-1.44) (6,1) -0.013 (-0.199) (6,2) -0.135 (-0.777) 1
Italy -0.205 (-0.249) (4.1) 0.010 (0.079) (4,1) -0.156 (-0.982) 1
Netherlands 0.076 (0.156) (4.1) 0.205 (1.177) (4,2) -0.003 (-0.017) 1
Sweden -1.226 (-2.23) (6,1) 0.046 (0.584) (6,1) 0.082 (0.507) 5
UK -0.455 (-1.365) (8,2) 0.116 (1.501) (6,1) -0.173 (-1.395) 2
(Alesina A., Roubini N., 1990, Political Cycles in OECD Economies, Working Paper No.
3478, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers Series, p.34 -35, Table 9,
p.36-37, Table 10, p.70-71, Table A-3).
Still, several problems remained unresolved in the Alesina and Roubini (1990,
1992) rational partisan model (Boix, 1997). The methodology employed to test it has
been considered unsuited to prove parts of its claims (Hibbs, 1992). The way in which
left-wing  cabinets  manage  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  after  economic  agents  have
adjusted to the initial shock is under specified in the model. Finally (Boix, 1997), the
rational  partisan  theory  hardly  accounts  for  the  hysteretic  behaviour  of  European
unemployment  in  the  1980s  and  for  the  emergence  of  learning  patterns  among
governments  of  different  ideological  traditions.  Work  by  Alvarez,  Garrett  and  Lange
(1991) and Beck et al. (1993) provide empirical confirmation of the favourable impact of
social  democratic  regimes  on  growth  rates.  Alesina  and  Summers  (1993)  show  how
central bank independence reduces inflation.
Another group of studies analyses the impact of political parties and corporatist
institutions on policy instruments. Part of the variation in unemployment rates across
OECD countries in the 1980s can be explained by the extent of macroeconomi c policies
(Nickell 1997). Boix (1998) explored whether the use of different macroeconomic policy
instruments distinguishes different parties in office (or distinguished them in particular
historical  periods),  alone  or  in  combination  with  specific  institut ional  traits  of  the
domestic economy. The analysis is made for the period that extends from 1962 to 1993,
on  a  sample  of  18  OECD  countries  (Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).13
Boix has summarized the results of the paper as follows: (1) After being relatively
loose in the 1960s, monetary policy tightened in the wake of the first economic shocks of
the 1970s, particularly in the late 1970s. Real interest rates peaked in the early 1980s and
then declined slowly. Fiscal policies became expansionary in the 1970s. Afterwards most
OECD countries strove towards fiscal consolidation; (2) Conservative governme nts have
pursued relatively restrictive macroeconomic policies -keeping the public budget roughly
in balance and real interest rates above the OECD average, except for the 1970s and early
1980s; (3) Social democratic cabinets in corporatist countries have f ollowed somewhat
looser  monetary  policies  than  conservative  countries  in  the  1960s  and  1980s;  fiscal
policies have been as tight as (or – in the 1960s – even tighter than) those of conservative
governments. In the 1970s, however, social democratic corporat ist countries embraced
the  most  counter  cyclical  budgetary  measures  across  all  OECD  nations;  (4)  In
decentralized economies, socialist governments have developed a policy mix opposite to
social democratic corporatist regimes: fiscal policies have been loos e and, to make up for
the  lack  of  stable  social  pacts  and  their  credibility  gap  in  regard  to  its  anti -inflation
preferences, monetary policies have been rather tight (except for the 1970s); (5) The
capacity  of  socialist  governments  to  pursue  monetary  expan sions  is  substantially
constrained by the level of central bank independence.
In a recent paper, Chang (2001) attempts to re-examine political business cycle
models by studying how policy makers' interests are modified by electoral rules and then
reflect on  the  macroeconomic  policies.  For  this  purpose,  Chang  constructed  a  cross -
national time series data that consists of 17 OECD countries (Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Ireland,  Norway,  Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom) and covers from the period
from 1973 to 1995. The Chnag's study suggests that electoral policy cycles exist, while
the characteristic of electoral policy cycles varies under different electoral systems. He
suggests  that  majoritarian  systems  (proportional  systems)  provide  politicians  stronger
incentives to increase geographically concentrated spending (public goods spending), and
electoral policy cycles of geographically concentrated spending (public good spend ing)
are  stronger  under  majoritarian  systems  (proportional  systems).  It  is  concluded  that
electoral systems are important in mediating the impact of politicians’ electoral -oriented
strategies on the macroeconomic policy.
Chappell  and  Veiga  (1999)  have  constructed  a  data  set  describing  economic
conditions and election outcomes in 13 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) over the 1960 to 1997 period. With this data set, they
investigated the performance of a variety of vote function specifications. Their purpose
was  to  assess  the  relative  performance  of  vote  functions  motivated  by  alternative
economic  paradigms  and  to  account  for  variations  in  the  extent  to  which  incumbent
parties are held responsible for economic outcomes (Chappell and Veiga, 1999 p.12).
Even if they have been unable to isolate any measures of political responsibility measures
that convincingly affect voting, and their inferences about voters' macroeconomic beliefs
remain  speculative,  however  they  have  found  some  evidence  to  support  the  general
hypothesis that economic outcomes affect election outcomes. Chappell and Veiga (1999)
strongest finding is that voters punish increases in inflation, especially those that exceed
the European average and they find weaker evidence for the hypothesis that voters reward
growth of real output (p.13).14
In  another  paper,  the  same  authors  (Veiga  and  Chappell,  2000)  provided  an
empirical appraisal of the influence of politics on the evolution of unemployment rates in
12 European Union countries and the U.S., for the period between 1960 and 1999. The
included  European  Union  countries  are  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In their
paper, Veiga and Chappell (2000) had in view three major objectives (p.1). The first is to
undertake improved and generalized tests of the predictions about unemployment rates
made by existing political business cycle models. The second objective is to investigate
how  the  structure  of  labour  markets  affects  the  determination  of  unemployment  and
conditions the operation of political pressures. The third objective is to investigate h ow
political fragmentation affects the level or variability of unemployment rates.
The obtained results suggest more support for transient cycles predicted by the
rational partisan models (with higher unemployment rates prevailing under right parties
than left parties) and little support for Nordhaus’s opportunistic political business cycle
model or Hibbs’s partisan model with permanent unemployment effects. But, the support
for the rational partisan model is tempered, because Veiga and Chappell (2000) fou nd no
evidence of interactions between partisanship and labour market structure (p.17). Since
the rational partisan theory relies on some labour market rigidities (specifically, long -term
contracts) to produce partisan cycles, the absence of interaction ef fects weakens support
for it.
At a microeconomic level, the analysis shows that labour market structure and
political  fragmentation  are  important  determinants  of  unemployment.  The  evidence
suggests  that  more  fragmented  coalition  governments  are  associated   with  higher
unemployment rates than single party governments, while centralized wage bargaining
institutions are associated with lower unemployment rates.
Clark et  al.  (1998)  emphasize  that  common  cross-country  studies  of  political
business cycle models may be seriously flawed since they do not account for institutional
differences that constrain national policymakers. For the most part, the political business
cycle  models  make  the  simplifying  assumptions  that  (a)  the  central  bank  and  the
government pursue the similar policies, and (b) policymakers have sufficient national
autonomy to implement their policies. Both assumptions need not hold in reality, as the
following  two  types  of  constraints  may  prevent  governments  from  implementing  an
opportunistic policy (Leertouwer and Maier, 1999, p.4-5): (1) national constraint (central
banks are increasingly made independent therefore one should not expect them to engage
in  opportunistic  behaviour)  and  (2) international  constraint  (under  a  regime  of  fixed
exchange  rates  and  high  capital  mobility,  the  possibility  for  autonomous  economic
policies is reduced; for the European Union countries and especially for the euro -zone,
the participation in a fixed exchange rate regime restricts national economic policies and
lowers the possibility of political business cycles).
In this idea, Leertouwer and Maier (1999) wish to answer the question of whether
the central bank can be held responsible for active opportunistic behaviour. The analysis
is made for the period that extends from 1960 to 1997, on a sample of 16 OECD countries
(Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Norway,  Spain,  Sweden,  UK,  US,  New  Zealand).  Their  paper  focused  on  policy
outcomes  for  which  the  central  bank  can  be  held  responsible,  namely  the  short-term
interest rate.
In the authors' opinion (Leertouwer and Maier, 1999, p.6), there are two reasons
for using the short-term interest rate: (1) A political business cycle in, say, M1, does not15
necessarily  imply  active  central  bank  behaviour:  If,  for  instance,  the  incumbent
government uses expansive fiscal policy before elections, and the central bank tolerates
this  behaviour,  then  obviously  a  monetary  aggregate  must  reflect  pre -electoral
manipulation. However, it would be unfair to fully blame the central bank, as the political
business cycle was created by the government, and (2) If politicians try to influence a
central bank before elections, the demand will in most cases not be formulated in terms of
a monetary aggregate (`Increase the growth rate of M1'), but in term of interest rates
(`Lower the interest rate!'). In consequence, "to answer the question of whether central
banks  regularly  misuse  monetary  policy,  evidence  should  be  found  in  monetary
instruments" (p.6), therefore in their paper they use short-term interest rates which are
tightly controlled by the central banks and reflect their intentions. In conclusion "should
political business cycles exist and should they be actively created by central banks, they
should be visible in the short-term interest rates" (p.6).
Concerning the international constraint, Leertouwer and Maier (1999) has been
investigated the relationship between exchange rate regimes and political business cycles.
Their sample runs from the 1960s until 1997 and consists of monthly data for 16 OECD
countries  (Austria,  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Finland,  Germany,
Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, US, New Zealand).
With the possible exception of Austria, running of countr y by country models
allows Leertouwer and Maier (1999) to assert that, in analysed 16 OECD countries, the
central banks do not manipulate interest rates before elections (at least, the short -term
interest rate does not show any sign of a political business  cycle). This suggests that either
government do not have possibilities to force central banks to yield, or central banks have
effectively resisted government's wishes (p.17). By running a panel data regressions, they
get more or less the same picture: is no evidence for central banks actively creating
political business cycles. Leertouwer and Maier (1999) reject the hypothesis that central
banks  actively  engages  in  opportunistic  behaviour,  so  that  their  conclusions  are  the
following:  (1)  If  political  business  cycles  in  macroeconomic  variables  such  as
unemployment show up, then the central banks should not be blamed. Either their actions
have no effect, or they simply do not engage in short -sighted behaviour", and (2) "If one
believes that central banks have the power to control interest rates, then one has to reject
the  idea  that  central  banks  help  governments  to  win  elections.  If  electoral  cycles  in
monetary aggregates exist, they could largely be demand -induced (perhaps due to fiscal
behaviour), but not due to central bank action" (p.16-17).
In  the  same  type  of  analysis, Waller  (1992) incorporated  the  discussion
concerning the central bank independence into a model with partisan politicians, arguing
that  instituting  this  rule  should  reduce  politically  indu ced  fluctuations  in  growth  and
inflation. Also, Berger and Woitek (1997) found in German economic data signals of an
impact  from  elections  and  ideology. They  find  cycles  in  M1  that  could  indicate  an
opportunistic behaviour of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Howev er, their findings indicate
that the Bundesbank did not target a monetary aggregate, but rather economic variables
such as inflation or output. Therefore Berger and Woitek conclude that the cycle in M1
was demand-driven rather than supply-driven.16
3. Empirical  Tests  Concerning  the  Political  Business  Cycles  in  the  Developing
Countries
The empirical literature on political budget cycles focuses mostly on advanced
industrial countries so that empirical studies of political business cycles in developing
countries are still scarce. According to Shi and Svensson (2000), there is no systematic
evidence  on  political  budget  cycles  based  on  a  large  cross -section  of  countries.  In
particular,  there  is  little  robust,  systematic  evidence  of  political  budget  cycles  in
developing  countries,  how  these  cycles  compare  with  those  observed  in  developed
countries,  and  what  the  sources  of  the  differences  may  be. Studies  using  data  from
developing countries include Block (1999), Magloire (1997), Khemani (1999), Kraemer
(1997), Schuknecht (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2000).
Bates  (1988)  discussed  public  investment  cycles  in  Zambia  in  the  1960s  and
Krueger  and  Turan  (1993)  discussed  such  cycles  in  Turkey  between  1950 -1980.
Schuknecht (1996) finds fiscal policy cycles of the Nordhaus - type for a panel of 35
developing  countries  where  governments  pursue  expansionary  fiscal  policies  before
elections  and  fiscal  austerity  afterwards.  There  is  also  a  literature  on  the  political
economy of developing countries that discuss the importance of the poli cy regime (e.g.,
Krueger, 1992), micro and macroeconomic policy failures (e.g., Krueger, 1993), domestic
institutional factors (e.g., Borner, Brunetti and Weder, 1996) or international influences
(Frey and Eichenberger, 1994).
Gonzalez (1999a, 2000b) classified some developing economies, mainly in Latin
America and Asia, as imperfect democracies. In the Gonzalez' opinion (Gonzalez, 2000a,
2000b),  while  most  developed  democracies  have  enjoyed  extremely  stable  political
environments  during  the  last  60  years,  the  group  of  imperfect  democracies  has
experienced  different  historical  swings  and  disruptions  that  in  some  cases  have
contributed to make their political systems more democratic, and in some others have
drastically reduced the political and civil rights of the country’s nationals. In other words
(Schuknecht, 1998b), the degree of democracy in each of these countries has displayed
some significant variation over time, even if elections may have taken place regularly, in
accordance to some specified election calendar. Often enjoying relatively well-organised
election  processes,  these  countries  satisfied  the  necessary  conditions  and  data
requirements for formal econometric studies to be performed (Shi and Svensson, 2001).
For example, Whitehead (1990) has shown that an electoral cycle in total government
spending  existed  in  Mexico  between  1965  and  1985.  Magaloni  (2000)  has  identified
opportunistic manipulations in Mexican monetary and fiscal policy between 1970 and
1998. Ames (1987) used a panel regression of 17 Latin American countries between 1947
and 1982 to show that public expenditures increased by 6.3% in the pre -election year and
decreased by 7.6% in the post-election year.
Kraemer (1997) investigated the impact of electoral politics on fiscal policy in  21
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean between 1983 -1995, finding that fiscal
deficits are higher in election years than would otherwise be predicted. Rojas -Suárez et al.
(1998) demonstrated a significant deterioration of the election year’s fisc al stance for
several Latin American countries and emphasises that in a large number of cases such
cycles had important destabilising effects. Contrarily, Agenor and Montiel (1996, quoted
in  Gonzales,  2000a)  could  not  detect  any  pre-electoral  activity  in  the  three  most
developed Latin American democracies (Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela).17
Schuknecht (1998a) studies empirically the impact of the exchange regime on
election - oriented fiscal policymaking in 25 developing countries
3 that held elections
during at least part of the 1978 to 1992 period. He found significant empirical evidence
for fiscal policy cycles only in countries with fixed exchange rates and sufficient reserves.
Schuknecht argued that flexible exchange regimes reduce the incentive for go vernments
to engage in expansionary fiscal policies before elections because such policies can result
in  devaluations  and  inflation  that  negatively  affects  government  popularity.  In  the
countries  with  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes,  governments  have  a  stronge r  interest  in
opportunistic fiscal expansion before elections, so that improve their re -election chances.
This  is  particularly  the  case  when  fixed  exchange  rates  reduce  the  danger  of  higher
inflation  through  expansion-induced  devaluation,  and  when  adequate  reserve  levels
diminish the short-term balance-of-payment constraint. In Schuknecht's opinion, these
findings have important implications for the choice of the exchange regime. For some
countries, there are doubts about the usefulness of fixed exchange ra tes for stabilizing the
macro economy, unless reforms of the institutional framework reduce the possibility for
election-oriented  fiscal  expansion.  "Fixed  exchange  regimes  (with  their  long -term
stabilizing effect) might then be complemented by reforms in t he institutional framework
which  reduces  the  scope  for  election-oriented  fiscal  expansion.  Countries,  where  the
institutional mechanisms to prevent strong election-oriented fiscal expansions are not in
place  or  where  institutional  reform  is  not  feasible,  h owever,  might  fare  better  with
flexible exchange regimes" (Schuknecht 1998a, p.17).
Gonzales (2000a) tries to explain the emergence of macroeconomic policy cycles
in under-developed democracies
4. Gonzales characterize every economy by an index of
democracy,  D  [0; ∞);  where  D = 0  stands  for  an  extremely  dictatorial  regime  and
D → ∞ represents an ideal democracy. The country's degree of democracy is reflected in
practice by a cost that the voters must bear when enforcing the political turnover after
each election (p.1). She also characterizes the economy by an index of transparency,
representing the likelihood with which the voters learn the politician's competence (p.2).
In Gonzales' opinion the transparency is likely to be higher in developed democracies,
where  information  may  be  more  readily  available  to  the  public  as  the  free  media
flourishes with the strengthening of the political and civil rights (p.1). The Gonzales'
analysis delivers a provoking (in author opinion) result: "whenever the two indices of
democracy  and  transparency  are  positively  correlated,  it  is  precisely  the  lack  of
democracy that gives rise to the election cycles" (Gonzales, 2000a, p.2). The Gonzales'
conclusion  suggests  that  the  election  cycles  may  not  emerge  when  countries  are
sufficiently democratic. She shows not only that it is the lack of democracy that may
generate  the  incentives  for  the  cycles  to  emerge,  but  also  that  the  magnitude  of  the
distortion  driven  by  political  motives  has  a  humped  shape  relative  to  the  degree  of
democracy prevailing in a country (Gonzales, 2000a, p.22).
3 The analysed countries in Schuknecht (1998a) paper are the following: Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Botswana,  Brazil,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Fiji,  Gambia,  Guatemala,  India,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Malta,
Mauritius,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  St.  Vincent,  Thailand,  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  Turkey,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
4 The  sample  period  runs  from  1975-1995,  in  annual  frequencies  and  the  countries  included  are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazi l, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, UK, Uruguay, USA and Venezuela.18
In another paper, Gonzales (2000b) tried to test whether a country's time -varying
degree of democracy affects the way in which economic policy is chosen as elections
approach. For this purpose, an econometric model is estimated for the case of Mexico's
fiscal  policy  between  1957  and  1997.  In  Gonzales'  opinion,  the  estimation  revealed
government's  strong  systematic  use  of  public  spending  in  infrastructure  and  current
transfers as a mean to earn votes. Gonzales found evidence that the increase in investment
in infrastructure starts relatively early in the pre-election period (at least 6 quarters prior
to the election), continues until at least the last quarter prior to the ballots, and then
diminishes as the election quarter is reached. The current transfers tend to be concentrated
very strongly during the election quarter only. The model shows that a democratisation
process generates two opposite forces affecting the size of the election cycle in public
spending  (Gonzales,  2000b,  p.23-24):  as  the  cost  of  enforcing  the  political  turnover
diminishes, competent governments are enticed to increase the magnitude of the visible
component of the government spending before the election to improve their re -election
chances, and as the higher level of democracy increases the degree of transparency (i.e.
the voters' chances to learn the true value of the office -holder's competence), the political
cycle is attenuated. Regarding the Mexican political system, Gonzales affirm that  the
democratisation process has magnified the risk for the government to lose power, but has
not  increased  the  country's  transparency  rapidly  enough  to  reduce  the  incumbent's
temptation to engage in opportunistic policy-making (Gonzales, 2000b, p.4-5).
According to Gonzales (2000b), the economic literature also documents a strong
pre-election use of public investment, specially in developing countries: Khemani (2000)
showed that state elections in India were preceded by a government spending spree in
road construction; Kraemer (1997) and Schuknecht (1996) had also reported evidence on
election cycles in developing countries that relied on the production of public capital.
"The  heavy  dependence  on  this  component  of  the  government  expenditures  contrasts
sharply with the evidence for OECD economies, where personal transfers and taxes have
usually been the policy instruments playing a major role around elections" (Gonzales
2000b, p.24).
The  differences between  developed  and  developing  countries  in  the  size  and
composition of the electoral policy cycle was systematically analysed in the recent paper
of Shi and Svensson (2001).
Shi and Svensson (2001) used a large panel data set, covering 123 developed and
developing  countries
5  over  a  21 -  year  period,  to  examine  the  relationship  between
5 The analysed countries in Shi and Svensson (2001) paper are the following: Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina,  Australia,  Austria,  Bahamas,  Bangladesh,  Barbados,  Belgium,  Belize,  Benin,  Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad,
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark,
Djibouti,  Dominican Rep,  Ecuador,  Egypt Arab Rep.,  El Salvador,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Fiji,  Finland,
France,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Germany,  Ghana,  Greece,  Grenada,  Guatemala,  Guinea,  Guinea -Bissau,
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya,  Korea Rep.,  Liberia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Madagascar,  Malawi,
Malaysia,  Maldives,  Mali,  Malta,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Mozambique,  Nepal,  Netherla nds,
New  Zealand,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Papua New Guinea,  Paraguay,
Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal, Romania,  Rwanda,  Samoa,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone, Singapore,  Slovak
Republic,  Slovenia,  Solomon Islands,  Spain,  Sri Lanka,  St. Lucia,  Sudan,  Suriname,  Sweden,
Switzerland,  Syrian Arab Rep,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Togo,  Trinidadand Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  United Kingdom,  United States,  Uruguay,  Vanuatu,  Venezuela,  Zambia,
Zimbabwe.19
elections and fiscal policy. In their sample, there are 29 developed countries (or, more
precisely,  high  income  countries,  defined  by  IFS  to  have  per  capita  GNP  above  the
threshold USD 9.656 in 1997) and 94 countries class ified as developing (i.e., middle- and
low-income). Shi  and  Svensson found  evidence  of  political  budget  cycles:  before
elections, whether revenues fall, the government increases spending so as to augment his
chances of re-election, leading to a higher deficit in election years. They also show that
there are large systematic differences between developed and developing countries in the
size and composition of the electoral policy cycle. The election induced fiscal deficit as a
share of GDP in an average developing country is more than twice the size of that of an
average developed country: in election years the deficit as share of GDP increases by 1.3
percentage  points  in  the  average  developing  country  and  roughly  0.6  percent  in  the
average developed country (Shi and Svensson, 2001, p.23, and table 4). The difference
between  developing  and  developed  countries  is  even  larger  when  using an election
variable so that on imposed the restriction that the expansion prior to the election and
contraction  after  the  election  are  of  the  same  magnitude.  In  this  case,  the  pooled
regression indicates that the average developing country experiences a 1.4 percentage
points of GDP larger swing in the political budget cycle ( Shi and Svensson, 2001, p.24,
and table 4).
Shi and Svensson demonstrated that the magnitude of the electoral policy cycle
and the difference in policy cycles between developed and developing countries depend
on the politicians' rents of remaining in power and the share of informed voters in the
electorate:  "The  higher  the  rents  of  remaining  in  power  and  the  lower  the  share  of
informed voters, the stronger the incentives to manipulate fiscal policy prior to elections"
(p.31). By running an econometric model, Shi and Svensson estimated that both these
institutional features differ significantly between the sample of developed and developing
countries: the difference is more than one standard deviation (of the pooled sample) for
the mean of the share of informed voters and about two standard deviations for the mean
of the rents indicator. Shi and Svensson confirmed by the econometric tests that these
differences  can explain the  systematic  differences  between  developed  and  developing
countries in the size and composition of political budget cycles ( Shi and Svensson, 2001,
p.25).
In a recent paper, Khemani (2000) (2000, p.32-33) finds evidence for political
cycles in public policy in the Indian states: election years have a negative effect on some
commodity  taxes,  a  positive effect  on  investment  spending,  but  no effect  on deficits
primarily because consumption spending is reduced ( Khemani 2000, p.32-33). Also, the
elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works
departments  (the fiscal effects  are  much  smaller  compared  to  the  electoral effect  on
roads).
The  paper  of  Treisman  and  Gimpelson  (1999)  focused  on  recent  elections  in
Russia and examined what policies would be recommended to incumbents by a rational,
re-election - motivated, behind-the-scenes political strategist who believes the public to
vote retrospectively. They found that certain instruments and means of finance were used
more in some elections than others. In this idea, the authors analysed the possibility that
rational  incumbents  will  choose  a  different  portfolio  of  manipul ations  in  different
elections, rather than utilised one indicator at a given time. In their opinion, incumbents in
any given election have a lot of lines of attack to affect voters' economic position –
minimum  wage  or  pension  legislation,  monetary  policy, different  types  of  transfers,
public spending, or tax cuts. For example, Treisman and Gimpelson discovered that in20
Russia, the government's ways to affect the voters' behaviour are: influence over money
supply growth, rates of public spending on social ser vices and job creation schemes, tax
rates, the minimum wage, state-provided pension and other benefits. Those measures can
be  financed  by  additional  taxes  or  other  revenues,  additional  public  borrowing,  or
additional  money  creation  and  each  of  which,  in  tu rn,  has  effects  on  the  economic
variables thought to influence voters. Concretely, in the periods before national votes in
Russia,  incumbents  have  variously  increased  real  minimum  wages  or  pensions  and
increased spending on popular programs such as health,  education, social policy, and
transfers to particular regions (Treisman and Gimpelson, 1999, p.29). Authors' analysis of
regional election results does suggest that in regions where public spending was higher or
increased relatively more and wage arrears were relatively lower, pro-reform incumbents
performed better in all of these four votes.
The  conclusions  of  these  analyses  are  that  there  are  differences  between  the
developed and developing countries in the size and composition of the electoral policy
cycle.  These  differences  are  explicated  on  the  one  hand  by  the  level  of  institutional
development,  measured,  for  example,  by  the index  of  democracy  (what  is,  according
Gonzales, 2000a a cost that the voters must bear when enforcing the political turnover
after each election) and the index of transparency (representing the likelihood with which
the voters learn the politician's competence). On the other hand, a researcher looking for
business cycles in any one economic indicator would have to conclude that th e evidence
is patchy: incumbents manipulate the economy, and through that the voters' behaviour,
but  in  any  given  election  have  a  lot  of  instruments.  By  this  reason,  the  econometric
models are not always the best tools to analyse the political business cyc les in developing
countries.
4. The Political Business Cycles in the East European Transition Countries
The empirical literature of political cycles in developing countries has been scarce
and, as a result, few studies focus specifically on the East Europ ean Candidate Countries
(Fidrmuc, 1996). As historical evidence, I mention the paper of Lafay (1981), which
analysed the relationship between economics and politics under communist regime in
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Roma nia during 1960's
and 1970's year. Most recently, a single country analyses are in Munich and Sorm (1995)
for Czech and Slovak elections in 1992, Jackson et al. (1996) and Bell (1997) for Polish
1993 election, Pacek (1994) for Bulgaria in 1991, Poland in 1 991, and Czechoslovakia in
1992. Earle et al. (1997) and Mateju and Rehakova (1996) analysed as well opinion -poll
data from the Czech Republic.
Fidrmuc (1996, 2000) tried to explain the recent political developments in the
transition countries of Central and East European Transition Countries by linking them to
the economic processes. The basic idea is that the voters' decisions are affected by the
state of the economy at the moment of the election, and/or their expectations of future
economic developments (the vote-popularity function). The process of economic reform
has played a fundamental role in determining the current state of the economy. Therefore,
he seeks to identify the relationship between voters' support for economic reforms, and
election outcomes. Because only three or four elections have taken place since the fall of
communism, Fidrmuc (1996, 1998) used regional data, where both election results as well
as explanatory variables are observed at the level of individual counties.21
To study the dynamics of political support for the reforms in Central and East
European Countries, Fidrmuc (1996) had building two-sector (state and private) model of
a transition economy. The main idea of Fidrmuc is that the workers in the private sector
always support rapid reforms, while the workers in the state sector and the unemployed
will  support  rapid  reforms  only  at  the  beginning  of  the  transition.  Later,  state -sector
workers and unemployed will vote for a reduction in the speed of reforms. The  reason  of
this assertion is the finding that, at the beginning, economic reforms in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed remarkable support from virtually every part of the
society. But, the economic collapse that followed had leading to a quickly decline of  the
public support for the reforms, and the reformers have been replaced by leftist parties
(even post-communists) in the second elections throughout the region. This is because the
voters  only  look  backwards,  not  forwards,  when  making  their  choice  at  the   polls
(Fidrmuc, 1996, p.2). However, in Fidrmuc's opinion even if the voters vote against the
reformers, they do not want to reverse the reforms altogether - only a change in the
strategy.
Undoubtedly, the Fidrmuc's approach concerning the causes and the  effects of
voters' opinions changing has been affected by a frequent narrow -mindedness (especially
in the early '90), in keeping with all the right-wing parties are reformers and all the left-
wing parties are anti-reformers. In fact, the moving towards left in voters' decisions in the
middle '90 may be explains by the fact that the voters penalize the government for poor
economic performance by voting for the opposition
6. And, in majority of Central and
Eastern Europe countries, at the beginning of the tra nsition, the left-wing parties had
setting up the governments. Consequently, the left-wing parties have been considered as a
political alternative. In Romania, the transition was beginning with a left -wing party, and
at  the  1996  election  it  has  been  changed  with  a  political  alternative:  the  right-wing
coalition. Fidrmuc admits himself that "although the reformists were voted out of power
in  Poland,  Hungary  and  Slovakia,  the  very  continuation  of the  reforms  has  not  been
threatened in any of these countries" (p.16).
To demonstrate his theory, Fidrmuc (1996) studied the impact of unemployment
upon voters' preferences. The relationship between unemployment and support for the
reforms  is  tested  empirically  using  regional  data  from  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. The econometric estimations show negative relationship between
the election results of the right-wing parties (pro-reform parties, in Fidrmuc' terms) and
unemployment, and positive relationship between the election results of the left -wing
parties and unemployment. The results for the nationalist parties are in general weaker
and  mixed  (Fidrmuc,  1996,  p.16).  In  another  paper,  Fidrmuc  (2000)  identified  more
detailed economic groups that support the reform (offer their vote in favour of rig ht-wing
parties) respectively, oppose the reform (caste a vote for left -wing parties). While the
followers of right parties are private entrepreneurs, white -collar workers and university-
educated voters, the left-wing parties cast their votes from the unemployed, retirees, blue
collar and agricultural workers.
If  indeed  the  left-wing  parties  are  against  reform,  then  the  results  found  by
Fidrmuc show that the continuation of the economic reforms can be put at question if
unemployment  gets  too  high.  If  this hypothesis  is  not  correct,  then  the  results  show
6 According to Nannestad and Paldam (1994), this is the so-called responsibility hypothesis: the voters
hold the current government responsible for the state of the economy.22
merely that there is a partisan behaviour of the electorate: the poor vote to the left -wing
parties, and the prosperous vote to the right-wing parties.
Duch  (1999)  presented  a  very  interesting  analysis  of  t he  heterogeneity  of
economic  voting  in  new  post-communist  democracies.  In  Duch's  opinion,  given  the
extreme economic turbulence in a transition economy, it would be reasonable to expect
that certain socio-economic groups would be more sensitive (and more v ulnerable) to
economic  fluctuations  than  others.  Economic  voting  in  Duch's  model  will  be  higher
amongst those citizens who are more likely to be affected by the fall -out from structural
reforms. In addition, in the post-communist countries, economic performance was highly
politicised  because  of  the  political  controversy  concerning  the  introduction  of  liberal
market  reforms.  These  ideological  cleavages  represent  a  basis  for  heterogeneous
economic  voting,  so  that  Duch  expects  those  opposed  to  government  marke t  reform
initiatives to be more sensitive to fluctuations than those who embrace the government’s
initiatives. The author reminds that the institutional features mediate economic voting:
institutional  contexts  can  either  increase  or  reduce  the  ability  of  v oters  to  attribute
responsibility  for  economic  performance.  For  example,  "an  incumbent  government
composed of a single party would offer voters a clearer notion of who is responsible for
economic  outcomes  than  would  be  the case for  a  government  coalition  c omposed  of
numerous parties" (Duch, 1999, p.9-10).
In  Duch's  model  there  are  two  other  factors  that  are  likely  to  generate
heterogeneity  in  economic  voting.  The  first  assumption  is  that  there  is  a  positive
correlation between levels of information and economic voting. Second, "citizens who are
more satisfied with the functioning of nascent democratic institutions are more likely to
punish incumbents for economic performance" (Duch, 1999, p.12). In other words, the
better-informed electors and those satisfied with democratic institutions are more likely to
engage in economic voting.
Duch  predicts  a  relatively  weak  correlation  between  national  economic
performance and incumbents' electoral popularity in the post -communist democracies of
East and Central Europe. Also, the author found relatively high levels of dissatisfaction
with  democracy  and  lower  levels  of  knowledge  about  democratic  institutions  to
undermine  the  relationship  between  economic  performance  and  incumbents'  electoral
fortunes  (p.20).  The  economic  voting  model  suggests  there  is  a  negative  correlation
between inflation (CPI) and incumbent vote share loss (measured as the change in vote
percentage between the current and previous general election), even if the correlation is
not very strong. Duch didn't find a statistically significant correlation between incumbent
support as the dependent variable and real GDP. Hence, the author's conclusion is that at
the aggregate level there is evidence of relatively low levels of economic voting in new
post-communist democracies. Duch extended this analysis by studying the Central and
Eastern  European  Barometer  surveys.  It  has  estimated  models  of  intended  vote  for
government  coalition  parties  in  nine  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries
7  for  the
years 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1996. He agues that the opinions of the politically informed
and  those  who  are  satisfied  with  the  performance  of  democratic  institutions  will
accurately reflect political and economic reality. As a result, the conclusions of Duch's
analysis are the following: (1) there are systematic differences in how voters respond to
the  economy  and  to  their  personal  financial  situation  and  these  can  have  important
7 The Central and Eastern European countries analysed in Duch (1999) paper are the following: Albania,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia23
aggregate-level political implications and (2) at least in the case of new democracies,
economic voting is clearly contingent upon levels of political information and satisfaction
with the performance of democratic institutions.
In  a  seminal book,  Williamson  (1994)  were  examined  several  hypotheses
concerning  the  determinants  of  successful  economic   reform.  In  the  opinion  of  the
Williamson team's experts, the three more robust conditions for successful reforms are a
strong political support for the reformer, a visionary leadership and a coherent economic
team (Williamson, 1994, p.589). That means, even if public support is not a sufficient
condition  for  success,  this  is  helpful  in  raising  the  chances  that  the  reforms  will  be
feasible and successful. Starting with this idea, in a recent paper, Hayo (2000) analysed
the  public  support  for  the  creation  of  a  market  economy  in  Eastern  Europe.  The
development of support for market reforms is analysed over time and countries. As a data
base, the Central and Eastern Euro barometers surveys are employed, covering up to 21
countries over a time period of 1990-96 and totalling more than 100000 observations on
individuals. Moreover, in a number of panel regressions, individual characteristics and
macroeconomic determinants of support for reforms are studied.
Hayo demonstrated that the support for the creation of a market economy depends
on personal circumstances (age, gender, education, relative income position) and on the
success  of  governments  in  keeping  inflation  rates  down.   Small  government  budget
deficits may also help to strengthen support. Differences in empl oyment, GDP per capita,
openness, private sector share and microeconomic transition progress do not show robust
effects on people's attitudes towards the creation of a market economy. Even though it is
difficult  to  make  policy  recommendations  based  on  the individual  characteristics  of
people, however, regarding the macroeconomic variables, Hayo (2000, p.21 -22) drew the
following  policy  conclusions:  (1)  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  focus  on
keeping inflation down seems to be consistent with the obje ctive of keeping support for
market reforms high, despite the fact that the absolute effect of inflation is quite small; (2)
unemployment may have some explanatory power at an individual level but it does not
help to explain support for market reforms on an aggregate level; (3) the effects of fiscal
policy are not entirely clear (although, higher budget deficits seem to reduce support for
reforms) and (4) the actual progress in market reforms does not affect opinion much. The
Hayo's  fourth  policy  conclusion  is,  perhaps,  influenced  by  the  fact  that  there  is
heterogeneity of public's opinions. According to Duch (1999), in a transition economy, it
would  be  reasonable  to  expect  that  certain  socio-economic  groups  would  be  more
sensitive (and more vulnerable) to economic fluctuations than others (see above). Hayo
found  himself  some  evidence  that  for  high-income  respondents  progress  in  price
liberalisation and competition regulation as well as a larger share of the private sector
improve support for reforms.
Therefore, the core conclusion of Hayo's analysis is that only a package of policies
will  be  highly  effective  in  helping  to  maintain  support  for  the  creation  of  a  market
economy. However, a feasible starting point for governments would be to keep inflation
rates down and to avoid excessive budget deficits (Hayo, 2000, p.22).
Hallenberg and Souza (2000) tests empirically whether there have been political
business  cycles  during  the  time  period  1990  to  1999  for  the  10  Eastern  European
accession countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia.). For  this  purpose, Hallenberg  and  Souza
analysis the role of exchange rates, capital mobility, and central bank independence in
restricting  or  encouraging  political  business  cycles.  According  to Mundell-Fleming24
model, under conditions of capital mobility, it found that both the type of exchange rate
regime  and  the  degree  of  central  bank  independence  affect  the  instruments  used  by
governments  to  influence  the  economy  before  elections.  Namely, countries  with
dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in
election years than in non-election years. In countries with independent central banks,
there is a monetary contraction in election years
8. If a country has a fixed exchange rate
regime, the government manipulates the economy in election years through running larger
budgets  instead  of  through  looser  monetary  policy.  Synthetically,  the  anticipations
concerning  the effects  of  exchange  rate  regime  and  central  bank  independence  on
opportunistic political business cycles, under conditions of capital mobility are presented
in Table 4.
In  authors'  opinion,  the  results  found  for  the  ten  Eastern  European  Accession
Countries are remarkably consistent with those presented by Clark and Hallerberg (2000)
for a data set of OECD countries. Monetary political business cycles exist only when the
exchange rate is flexible and when the central bank is dependent upon the government .
(Hallenberg  and  Souza,  2000,  p.15). When  the  central  bank  is  dependent  upon  the
government, there is a strong increase in the money supply in pre -electoral periods. When
the central bank is independent, there is a tightening of the money supply (though smaller
than the expansion under the alternative regime).
Table 4: Predictions about the effects of exchange rate regime and central bank



















) This Table appears as Table 1 in Hallenberg and Souza (2000, p.5).
Hallenberg and Souza (2000) tested, also, the hypothesis that, when exchange
rates are fixed, governments engage in fiscal expansions shortly before elections (fiscal
political business cycles). They found evidence that such fiscal expansio ns are present in
Eastern European Accession Countries. The econometric estimation indicates that budget
deficit worsens 1.5% in pre-electoral periods in countries with fixed exchange rates. In
countries with flexible exchange rates, there is a smaller mov e downward, but in this case
the variable is not significant (Hallenberg and Souza, 2000, p.17).
According to these results, the authors offered a remarkable analysis concerning
the implications for the accession to the European Union : the study confirms that the
Accession Countries' governments act very much like their OECD counterparts. If the
country has a flexible exchange rate and the monetary authorities are not independent,
then the government may create a political cycles through monetary expansion . But, the
accession process assumes that the future member states implement indeed independent
central banks. Independent monetary authorities can eliminate such cycles in countries
8 In the opinion of Hallenberg and Souza (2000, p.3), "this suggests that newly created independent central
banks may use electoral years to send signals to markets that they are truly in dependent".25
with flexible exchange rates. Moreover, once the Eastern European states will become
members, monetary policy will be set by the European Central Bank (ECB) and exchange
rates become fixed. For that reason, political business cycles can be created only by the
use of fiscal policy. But, the evidence show that scale of this cycle  recorded in Accession
Countries in 1990-1999 period has been no worse than in the European Union members
states before the Treaty of Maastricht. And the Hallenberg and Souza (2000) conclusion
is optimistic:
"Given that the original members of the euro area were able to proceed and to meet
the Maastricht Criteria despite the presence of such cycles, there is no reason to
believe that the cycles as they now exist in the Accession Countries should lead to
any delays in EMU membership" (Hallenberg and Souza, 2000, p.18).
Because,  in  their  opinion,  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP)  as  it  is  now
constructed  does  not  seem  to  be  a  credible  constraint  to  prevent  governments  from
overspending  in  election  years, Hallenberg  and  Souza  (2000)  suggested  a  alternative
solution so that such politically motivated fiscal cycles should be diminish or eliminate.
This alternative might be for governments to put in place domestic institutions, such as a
strong finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts.
5. The Political Business Cycles in Romania
The Romanian former Prime Minister Stolojan, in a recent paper (Stolojan, 2000)
has argued that while severe crises promote reform, Romanian policymakers missed the
linkage between crisis and reform. Romania met two important wind ows of opportunity
for a bold and consistent reform, and missed both: December 1989, and November 1996.
According to Stolojan' opinion, in a democracy, political parties compete for citizens'
votes through the electoral programs based on different politica l ideologies: liberal, social
democratic and so forth. However, in transition from the centralised planned economy to
a market economy, despite ideological backgrounds, political parties were supposed to
arrive at a more consistent and comprehensive view o f the objectives and strategies of
economic  transition  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  there  are  certain  objectives
(milestones) of transition that cannot be ignored by any political party that has to lead a
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Second, transition has
proved to be a long-term process running beyond electoral cycles. Therefore, different
governments supported by different political parties or coalitions had to pursue the same
objectives for periods of time longer than an electoral cycle. In Romania, as everybody
may notice, the transition objectives lack consistency and comprehensiveness between
governments. Most governments claimed that the only real economic reform is the one
that started with its own administration. To make this concept effective, each government
wasted  time  and  resources  to  change  laws  and  regulations.  This  induced  uncertainty
within the business environment that, together with the weak capability of governments
for policy-making and implementation, finally transformed Romania into a country of
perpetual problems and promises.
From Romania, the democratic experience computes a small number of electoral
moments. Therefore, it is not possible yet to build an electoral behaviour econometric
model using the political time series. In these circumstances, in the following section, by
the examination of the political and economic dynamics during the 1990 -2000 period, I26
try  only  to  identify  some  significant  signals  concerning  the  economic  impact  of  the
electoral timing. In the next one, I utilise an econometric model to analysis the political
behaviour using a regional economic and political data.
5.1. Macro-economic Signals of the Political Behaviour in Romania
To analysis the macro-economic impact of the incumbents' electoral behaviour I
have studied the dynamics of the economic structures during the 1990 -2000 period. The
mainstay  hypothesis  was  that  reform  process  can  be  signalling  by  major  changes  in
macroeconomic structures, and inversely, the relative stability of these structures can be a
signal of slowing down the reform.
In the Figure no. 1 it is showing the year on year dynamics of the Gross Domestic
Product structures. The structures for the years 1985 to 2000 are calculated as a weight of
Gross Value Added into the Gross Domestic Product by main activities. The changes
index are calculated like the angles between structural vectors and there are normalised so






















Figure 1: The intensity of structural changes in Romanian economy (changes in weight of
Gross Value Added into the Gross Domestic Product by main activities)
Keeping out the structural change from the electoral year 1990 (considered to be
the result of one major election of Romanian people expressed through the December
1989 Revolution), during the period 1991-2000, the amplitude of the macro structural
changes registered the local minimum points in electoral years (1992, 1996 and 2000) and
local maximum points in the post-electoral years (1993 and 1997).
In  these  conditions,  I  consider  that  the  shape  of  the  structural  changes  curve
pointed up in Figure 1 suggests the following conclusions:
– During  the  1985-1989  periods  the  Romanian  economic  macro  structures  were
relatively blocked, as a result of socialist model using, through which the economic
and political shocks were central controlled by planning centralized administrative
measures.27
– The size of the macro structural changes revealed local minimum points for el ection
years (1992, 1996, 2000). This could be explained by the fact that the reform process
supposes adoption of measures having usually, unpopular effects. And such effects
are, without doubt, undesirable for the incumbents, mainly in the election years.
– The maximum intensity of structural changes was recorded in post – electoral years:
all political programs proposed the speeding of economic reforms and, consequently,
every  new  government  tried  to  promote  measures  to  speed  up  some  economic
changes process.
– The apparent atypical situation of the electoral year 1990 could be explained by the
fact that, essentially, the economic evolutions in that year were also the effect of a
political option, of a fundamental option of the Romanian people, expressed i n the
December 1989 Revolution. The high intensity of the structural changes from 1991 -
the post-electoral year- confirms such a hypothesis.
Consequently, I consider that in the evolution of the national economy during the
1990 -  2000  period  certain  signals  of  the  incumbents'  electoral  behaviour,  can  be
identified even if with out a support from econometric tools, due to the fact that reliable
data series are not available.
5.2. Political – Economic Regional Model for Romania
The  democratic  experience  of  Romania,  as  I  showed  above,  recorded  a  small
number of electoral events. Consequently, is impossible to build an econometric model
able to analyse the effects of population and incumbents’ electoral behaviour based on the
dynamics of macroeconomic series. For this reason  different hypotheses regarding the
relationship between economic and political system were tested using the data recorded at
regional level, for the electoral years 1992, 1996 and 2000
9.
9 In this section I use the following symbols for the Romanian political parties, political formations or their
coalitions:
APR – Alliance for Romania
CDR – Democratic Convention from Romania
FDSN – National Salvation Democratic Front
FSN – National Salvation Front
PD – Democratic Party
PDAR – Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania
PDSR – Social Democracy Party of Romania
PNL – National Liberal Party
PNTCD – National Peasant Christian Democratic Party
PRM – Great Romania Party
PSDR – Social Democratic Party of Romania
PSM – Labour Socialist Party
PUNR – Romanian National Unity Party
UDMR – Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania
USD – Democratic Social Union28
First of all I was tested the so-called responsive hypothesis according to which the
electorate considers that the government is responsible for the state of the economy  and
consequently,  when  the  unemployment  (and  the  inflation)  record  high  values,  the
electoral  chances  of  the  governmental  party  (coaliti on)  diminishes,  and  vice  versa:  a
relatively well economic status leads to the increase of electoral chances of the party in
office. From statistical point of view, the hypothesis mentioned above assumes that:
1. There is a negative correlation between the unemployment rate and the votes
given to the ruling party
and
2. There is a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the votes
given to those parties (coalition) from opposition, which are considered to be
an alternative at government in the electoral year.
However,  the  distribution  of  regional  votes  for  the  incumbents  (parties  or
coalitions)  in  the  electoral  years  1992,1996,  2000  (Fig.  2,  3,  …7)  don't  confirm
hypothesis of a significant negative correlation between the unemployment rate and  the
electoral  support.  Analogously,    a  significant  positive  correlation  between  regional
unemployment  rate  and  electoral  support  of  the  parties  situated  in  opposition  (the
challenger) cannot be observed (see Table 5). The only correct signs (in accordance  with
the above hypothesis) from the coefficients of correlation were recorded in 2000; as we'll
show further, the values taken by the coefficient of correlation can be explained by taking
into consideration of a partisan political business cycle model.
If the above-mentioned hypothesis could be correct, then the points in Figures 2,
3, and 4, that illustrate the votes for the political parties, political formations or their
coalitions witch form the Government depending on the unemployment rate, in 1992,
1996 and 2000 must show a downward trend. Inversely, the points in Figures 5, 6, and 7,
that illustrate the votes for the political parties, political formations or their coalitions
situated in opposition depending on the unemployment rate, in 1992, 1996 a nd 2000 must
show an upward trend. But these figures don't show trends according to the responsive
hypothesis.
Table 5: The coefficients of correlation between the regional unemployment rates and the





formations or their coalitions
witch form the Government
Political parties, political
formations or their coalitions
situated in opposition
1992 0.31 (FDSN+FSN) -0.26 (CDR)
1996 0.33 (PDSR) -0.17 (CDR+USD)
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Figure 2: 1992 – votes (%) for ruling political parties, political formations or their
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Figure 3: 1996 – votes (%) for ruling political parties, political formations or their
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Figure 4: 2000 – votes (%) for ruling political parties, political formations or their
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Figure 5: 1992 – votes (%) for political parties, political formations or their coalitions
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Figure 6: 1996 – votes (%) for political parties, political formations or their coa litions
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Figure 7: 2000 – votes (%) for political parties, political formations or their coalitions
situated in opposition depending on the regional unemployment rates
Further on, I tested for Romanian case a recent hypothesis formulated by Rodrik
(1995)  and  Fidrmuc  (1996)  for  Central  and  Eastern  European  transition  countries,
hypothesis regarding the political support for the economic reform.
Rodrik (1995) formulated the hypothesis that the unemployed electors cast their
vote in favour of a party that realises a fast reform because they think that the rapid32
economic reform has as results an outcome increase and an enhance of the economic
private sector. The consequence of these evolutions consists in the increasing chances for
the unemployed to find a job in private sector. According to Rodrik, in the Central and
East European Countries only the right-wing parties are pro-reform political formation,
while left-wing parties are anti – reform. As a result, the unemployed vote for the right -
wing political parties. A version of this hypothesis is given in a paper written by Fidrmuc
(1996). According to Fidrmuc, the type of behaviour described by Rodrik is specific for
the unemployed only in the first part of the transition, when it is expected a fast and
successful reform. As far as the reform processes are developing without major results
regarding the employment and the economic status of disadvantaged social categories, the
unemployed become supporters of those political parties, which promote a reduction of
the reform speed and maintain a high proportion of the public sector. The same as in
Rodrik's  model,  also  in  Fidrmuc's  model,  the  left -wing  parties  represent  anti-reform
political forces and for this reason, after the first transition years the political support of
the  disadvantaged  categories  (like  unemployed)  is  straighten  towards  the  left -wing
parties.
This caricatured political system model set up for the candidate countries, with
strong partisan and ideological influences (supporting the idea that the right -wing parties
are pro-reform while the left-wing parties are against, that means that the last ones are
anti-European), was invalidated by the political evolutions from these cou ntries. All the
candidate countries had both right and left political systems, without recording significant
steps  forward  or  backward  of  the  reform  process.  There  are  significant  differences
between countries regarding the reform stage but there are not d ifferences within the
same country under different political systems. In spite of these, I have tested the Rodrik
model, the same as the Fidrmuc's version of Rodrik model. The tested hypotheses are:
1. There is a positive correlation between unemployment r ate and votes carried to
the right-wing parties and a negative correlation between the unemployment
rate and votes carried to the left-wing parties (Rodrik's hypothesis)
and
2. There  is  a  positive  correlation  between  the  unemployment  rate  and  votes
carried  to  the  rights-wing  parties  and  a  negative  correlation  between  the
unemployment and votes carried to the left-wing parties at the beginning of
transition process, while in later reform phases the support of the disadvantaged
categories is straightened towards the left (Fidrmuc's hypothesis)
The vote's distribution for the rights and left-wing parties (or coalitions) is shown
in Table 6. In the Romanian case, because the fluent political environment, it is not easy
to include a party in a political wing. In these circumstances, the parties are included in
the right or left wing in keeping with theirs official positions.
The  Rodrik's  hypothesis  cannot  be  empirically  upheld,  at  least  starting  from
electoral regional data. From Table 6 must be notice that alwa ys the correlation between
votes  from  the  left-  wing  parties  and  the  unemployment  rate  is  positive,  while  the
correlation  between  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  electoral  support  for  right -wing
parties is negative (contrary with Rodrik's hypothesis).33
Table 6: The coefficients of correlation between the regional unemployment rates and the
electoral behaviour
The coefficients of correlation between the
regional unemployment rates votes carried for:
Electoral years Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
1992 0.24 (FDSN+FSN+PSM) -0.26 (CDR)
1996 0.32 (PDSR+USD) -0.26 (CDR)
2000 0.30 (PDSR+PD) -0.23 (PNL)
The obtained results can't be a valuable argument for the Fidrmuc's version model
too. The political support for the right wing is maintained relatively  constant and it is
negatively  correlated  with  unemployment  rate,  while  the  political  support  for  left
increases, at least for median interval. The last result comes out from defining left -wing
side.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  rate  employment  and political  support  of
Democratic Party (PD) is insignificant one as results from Table 7. The insertion of this
party in the left political side (in 1992 trough FSN – National Salvation Front and in 1996
trough  USD –  Democratic  Social  Union)  has  an  influence  on  global  correlation
coefficient. This aspect is just more evident in the case of PSM – Labour Socialist Party,
which was included in the left political side in 1992; its political support was negatively
correlated with unemployment rate.
Table 7: The coefficients of correlation between the regional unemployment rates and the
votes for Romanian political parties





*** PUNR PRM UDMR
1992 0.33 0.07 -0.20 -0.26 -0.06 -0.14 -0.10
1996 0.33 0.08 – -0.26 0.02 0.28 -0.13
2000 0.30 -0.03 – -0.23 – 0.24 -0.26
* For the 1992 elections – FDSN,
** For the 1992 elections – FSN, for the 1996 elections – USD
*** For the 2000 elections – PNL
The  relative  steadfastness  of  the  correlation  coefficients  recorded  by  the  two
important  political  parties  PDSR –  Social  Democracy  Party  of  Romania  and  CDR –
Democratic  Convention  from  Romania  cannot  be  an  argument  in  the  favour  of  the
Fidrmuc's hypothesis
10.
Further, I tested the hypothesis of the partisan political behaviour, in the sense
defined in section 1. According to this approach, left-wing parties are relatively more
concerned  on  unemployment  and  economic  growth,  and  relatively  less  interested  in
10 Even Fidrmuc gave up to this hypothesis and in his later studies he ad opted a partisan hypothesis (see,
Fridmuc, 2000).34
inflation, while right-wing parties are more concerned on inflation and less on economic
growth  and  unemployment. The  electors'  votes  are  straightened  towards  that  party
promoting  a  program  which  seen  as  being  closer  to  their  own  expectations.  As  a
consequence, the unemployed votes towards left wing parties.
To  assess  the  hypothesis  regarding  the  partisan  political  support  I  was  firstly
tested two following simple econometric models :
PDSRit = a0 + a1 RSOMit + a2 CHit + et (2)
CDRit = b0 + b1 RSOMit + b2 CHit + vt (3)
Expected results: a1 > 0, a2 < 0, b1 < 0, b2 < 0.
The symbols used in the models have the following meaning:
– PDSRit and CDRit is the share of votes received by the respective parties in county i
(i = 1…41) at the elections in the electoral year t (t = 1992, 1996, 2000),
– RSOMit represents the unemployment rate recorded in county i in the electoral year
t;
– CH  is  a  dummy  variable,  which  takes  the  value  1  for  the  county  Covasna  and
Harghita whichever is the electoral moment t and zero for all the other counties,
because a large share from Covasna and Harghita counties electors are politically
faithful, based on nationalist views;
– a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, b2 these are the six parameters of the models (2) and (3), and
– eit and vit are the error terms – random variables that respect the conditions for using
the Ordinary Least Squares Method (normally and independently distributed with
zero mean and constant variance).
The  estimation's  results  for  123  records  (41  counties   3  electoral events)  are
shown in Table 8, and in Figure 8 and 9.














Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.32
F-statistic 24.74 29.67
Akaike info criterion 8.046 7.758
Schwarz criterion 8.114 7.827
(the standard deviations are given in brackets, with italic fonts).35
The estimators are statistically significant, with a level of significance over 99%.
The probability of rejection the models (Prob (F – statistic) is smaller than 0.0001%. The
estimators of the models' coefficients have correct signs (the signs anticipated for the
partisan business cycle theory):
a1 = 1.670 is positive (according to the theory) and significantly different from zero
with a probability over 99.99%
b1 = –2.092 is negative (according to the theory) and significantly different from zero
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Social Democracy Party of Romania  (PDSR):
Regional distribution of votes, 1992 -2000
Figure 8: Political regional model estimation – Regional distribution of votes for PDSR –
Social Democracy Party of Romania
Because  a  share  from  Covasna  and  Harghita  counties  electors  are  politically
faithful, based on nationalist views, the estimators' signs for a 2 and b2 coefficients are
negatives (the proportion of the UDMR' captive voters affects negatively the formation up
of the PDSR and CDR's electors).
The  most  important  problem  of  these  simple  models  is  that  they  are  able  to
explain only about 28% - 32% of vote behaviour setting up (R
2). For this reason I built
up, in the same spirit of the partisan political business cycle theory, other econometric
models, starting from the hypothesis that there are faithful electors for every party being
on political market and struggle for that.36
That  means  that,  without  any  major  political,  social  or  economic  events,  the
political  behaviour  and  options  of  some  electors  remain  unchanged,  while  economic
factors explain only the forming behaviour of the electors without long – lasting options.
More exactly, there is certain inertia in the dynamic of political options, so that electors'
behaviour at the moment t is not absolutely independent from the options expressed in the
previous elections. Starting from the fact that the formation of the elector s' options at the
moment t – 1 is depending on the unemployment rate and these options have a some
degree  of  inertia,  the  conclusion  is  that  the  options  of  non -captive  electorate  (those
electors which don't prefer almost permanently one party or an other),  are formed basing
on the changes in the unemployment rates between the actual electoral period ( t) and the
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Democratic Convention from Romania (CDR):
Regional distribution of votes, 1992-2000
Figure 9: Political regional model estimation – Regional distribution of votes for CDR –
Democratic Convention from Romania
The literature analysis also the phenomenon of the political image eroded during
the government stay in office (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, 1997 and 1999). This effect
is referred to as the cost of ruling, implying the incumbent governments lose support as
they alienate some supporters with decisions they make while in office. The longer they
stay in office and the higher their vote shares in the preceding elections the more likely it
is that such losses will occur.
I have tested, in these conditions, two econometric as following:
PDSRit = a1 PDSRi, t-1 + a2 (RSOMit – RSOMi, t-1) + a3 D1996 + et (4)37
CDRit = b1 CDRi, t-1 + b2 (RSOMit – RSOMi, t-1) + b3 D2000 + vt (5)
The expected results according to the theory are:
a1 > 0, b1 > 0, Means that every party has a faithful electors;
a2 > 0, b2 < 0, Means that the increase of the unemployment favours left -wing parties
and disadvantage right-wing parties.
a3 < 0, b3 < 0, Means that it exists a cost of ruling.
The symbols used have the following significances:
– PDSRit and CDRit represents the share of votes gained by the parties in county  i
(i = 1…41) at the elections from moment t (t = 1992, 1996, 2000),
– PDSRi, t-1 and CDRi, t-1 are the votes (%) gained by parties in the county i at the
previous elections (t-1),
– RSOMit and RSOMi, t-1 are the unemployment rates registered in county i, in the
electoral moment t, and at the preceding elections (t-1),
– D1996 the dummy variable that capture the cost of ruling for PDSR,
– D2000 the dummy variable that capture the cost of ruling for CDR,
– a1, a3, a3, b1, b2, b3 are the coefficients of the models (4), respectively (5), and
– eit and vit are the error terms – random variables that respect the conditions for using
the Ordinary Least Squares Method (normally and independently distributed with
zero mean and constant variance).
In the models (4) and (5) were not used variables dummy for counties Covasna
and  Harghita  because  autoregressive  functioning  of  the  models  diminishes  the  effect
induced by the stable fidelity of electors from those regions. It must be mentioned that the
electors from Covasna and Harghita changes only the amount of the votes gained by
PDSR and CDR but not also the dynamic of votes gained by these parties in mentione d
counties. The results of the estimation (for 123 data = 41 counties  3 electoral events)
are shown in the Table 9 and in Figure 10 and 11.
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Akaike info criterion 6.737 7.384
Schwarz criterion 6.825 7.472
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Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR)
Autoregressive model: Regional distribution of votes, 1992-2000
Figure 10: Political regional autoregressive model estimation – Regional distribution of
votes for PDSR – Social Democracy Party of Romania
The estimators for regression equations parameters are significan t different from
zero with a level of significance over 99%. The models' probability of rejecting  (Prob (F -
statistic) is smaller than 0.0001%. The estimators of the models' coefficients have correct
signs (the signs anticipated for the partisan business c ycle theory) and the models (4) and
(5) are better from econometric point of view than the models (2), respectively (3). The
last conclusion derives both from comparison between the coefficients of determination
R
2, and from the analysis of values calculated for Akaike and Schwartz criteria.
The obtained results lead to the following conclusions:
– The level and the dynamic of the unemployment rates at regional level have an
influence  on  vote  behaviour,  and  this  effect  is  in  accordance  with  the  partisan
political  business  cycle  theory:  in  the  areas  with  a  higher  unemployment  rate  a
voting preference (tendency) towards the political left is manifest;39
– Elasticity  of  the  electoral  behaviour  in  dependence  of  economic  factors
(unemployment rate) is rough equal (with different signs of course), in the case of
the  two  parties.  According  to  the  Wald'  test,  the  hypothesis  of  the  equality  (in
absolute value) of the two parameters  |a 2| = |b2|, are accepted with a probability over
99%. This means that in the Romanian political environment the two parties have
been  perceived  by  the  population  as  being  typical  for  the  left  (PDSR)  and
respectively for the political right (CDR).
– Every one from the two parties has faithful electors (a 1 and b1 are positive and are
significantly different from zero). The CDR' electors fidelity is a little bit superior
comparable to the PDSR' electors fidelity (b 1 > a1); but in spite of the fact that the
Romanian's political right wing has more faithful electors, this captive electorate has
a small size (relative to the whole Romanian electorate).
– The cost of ruling, implying the incumbent governments lose support while there are
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Democratic Convention from Romania (CDR)
Autoregressive model: Regional distribution of votes, 1992 -2000
Figure 11: Political regional autoregressive model estimation – Regional distribution of
votes for CDR – Democratic Convention from Romania
5.3. Conclusions
For  Romania,  the  macro-economic  data  suggests  that  is  correct  a  hypothesis
according  to  which  a  significantly  connection  between  the  political  behaviour  of  the
politicians and economic evolution exists. The intensity of the structural changes records
local minimum points in electoral years. This fact could be explained by the following
phenomenon:  to  promote  economic  reforms  means  to  adopt  some  measures,  which40
usually are accompanied by unpopular effects. These types of effects are not those desired
by the incumbent governments, especially in election years.
At the same time, the maximum intensity of the structural  changes was recorded
in post – electoral years: all the political programs proposed the speeding of the economic
reforms and consequently when a party or a coalition wins the political power, it tries to
promote measures to speed up some economic changes process. The regional data also
confirm the hypothesis of  significantly connections between the state of the economy and
political behaviour of the electors. The level and the dynamics of the unemployment at
regional level have an influence on vote behaviour, as stated by the  partisan political
business cycle theory: in the areas with a higher unemployment rate the voting preference
(tendency)  is  skewed  towards  the  political  left  side.  But each  of  the  most  important
Romanian political parties of the period 1992 –2000 (PDSR and CDR} have faithful
electors. The CDR fidelity proved to be superior to the fidelity of the PDSR's electors: the
CDR captive electorate has a big fidelity, but a small size (relative to total Romanian
electorate)
The results obtained must be understood under the limits inner to the research
method used. For example, it is likely that the bias towards left –side political spectrum
observed in areas with high unemployment rates is actually explained by the behavioural
specificity  of the population from poor zones. Given the unavailability of credible socio -
economic information regarding poverty in Romanian geographical areas over the entire
1992 – 2000 period, the above-mentioned hypothesisis not directly tested in this working
paper. The underlying reasoning is that the poor zones have usually  high unemployment
rates, and the econometric models presented here could offer, after all, arguments for two
important hypotheses: (1) the electors from the poor regions vote preponderantly for le ft-
wing political parties, and (2) the unemployment rate could be used as a proxy variable
for poverty in the regional political behaviour models.
6. Policy relevance
The intuitive explanation concerning the existence of political business cycles in
Eastern European economies is that poor and lower-educated voters in these countries are
more  myopic  and  hence  more  susceptible  to  short -term  political  manipulation.  But
empirical evidences consistent with such hypothesis do not exist as yet ( Khemani, 2000).
Seminal analyses confirm that the Eastern European Countries' governments act similarly
with  their  European  Union  Countries  counterparts (Hallenberg  and  Souza,  2000).
However, these resemblances in political behaviours doesn't imply the fact that such the
existence  of  politically  driven  business  cycles  will  be  eliminate in Eastern  European
states, and therefore, not in Romania too.
Despite  the  common  elements,  there  are  undoubtedly  differences  between  the
European Union developed countries and Eastern Europe an transition countries regarding
the amplitude  and succession of phases composing  the electoral policy cycle. These
differences are explicated by the level of institutional development, and by the extent of
the political tradition in a democratic framework. For these reasons, it is very important to
identify the institutional and other constraints that can alleviate the incumbents' yearning
to generate an electoral cycle.41
There  are  many  types  of  both  national  and  international  constraints  that  may
prevent governments from implementing an opportunistic policy (Leertouwer and Maier,
1999).  Between  the  national  constraints,  the  most  known  are  the  central  bank
independence and the existence of a political agreement for some domestic institutions,
such as a strong finance minister or negotiated fiscal contracts. On the other hand, the
international constraints can be induced by high capital mobility under a regime of fixed
exchange rates. Participation in a fixed exchange rate regime restricts national economi c
policies and lowers the possibility of political business cycles.
According to Hallenberg and Souza (2000), the government may create political
cycles  through  monetary  expansion only  in  the  countries  when  the  exchange  rate  is
flexible and when the central bank is dependent upon the government. But, the accession
process  assumes  that  the  future  member  states implement  indeed  independent central
banks.  Independent  monetary  authorities  can  eliminate  such  cycles  in  countries  with
flexible  exchange  rates.  Moreover,  once  the  Eastern  European  states  will  become
members, monetary policy will be set by the European Central Bank and exchange rates
become fixed. For this reason, political business cycles might be created only by the use
of fiscal policy. On the one hand, the election-oriented fiscal policies could be facilitated
by the weak institutional structures in many Eastern European countries ( Schuknecht,
1998). On the other hand, in developing countries, like Romania, political upheavals may
be more frequent, and interest group politics more fractious, leading to higher discount
rates for politicians, and poor institutional monitoring of performance in public works
may  provide  considerable  room  for  improvement  under  political  pressure  ( Khemani,
2000). In these conditions, from a normative perspective, institutional mechanisms which
are adapted to each country's institutional framework and which constrain discretionary
government policies, might be worthwhile considering if expansionary policy making
around elections is perceived to be undesirable (Schuknecht, 2000, p.127). For example,
the strengthening of fiscal rules and institutions may well be a key element towards
reducing policy volatility around elections (Schuknecht, 1998).
Hallenberg  and  Souza  (2000,  p.19-20)  argue  that  such  constraining domestic
institutions  can  be  a strong  finance  minister  or negotiated  fiscal  contracts.  In  their
opinion, given that strong finance ministers tend to work best in countries with one -party
governments  or  in  countries  where  there  are  two  clearly  opposing  blocks  of  parties
(currently  a  rarity  in  the  European  continent),  it  is  likely  that  only  negotiated  fiscal
contracts will be effective constraining domestic institutions, not only for the Accession
Countries, but for the European Union as a whole (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999). The
negotiating fiscal contracts work as follows: "the respective political parties that form the
government  negotiate binding budget  targets  for  every  ministry before portfolios  are
distributed to the parties in a coalition agreement. The negotiation of the targets ensures
that the partners consider the full tax burden of their spending decisions, and the process
reduces the scope of the common pool resource problem, and along with it its deficit-
increasing bias" (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 2000, p.19-20).
The idea that the institutional framework is crucial to maintaining fiscal discipline
in many countries, which have featured weak fiscal institutions in the past,  is largely
sustained in the economic literature
11. Certain fiscal rules as constitutional or legislative
11 According to Schuknecht (2000, p.126-127), this idea is sustained by numerous authors like Buchanan in
many of his writings, Von Hagen and Harden (1994), Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein (1995),
Campos and Pradhan (1996), Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997)42
deficit  limits,  can  complement  other  fiscal  institutions  ( strong  finance  minister  or
negotiated fiscal contracts) in maintaining fiscal discipline and eliminating opportunities
for overspending in electoral period (election-oriented spending). Among these rules may
be mentioned: emphasis on macroeconomic discipline in the budget formulation stage,
constraints  on  the  legislature  in  introducing  new  spending  proposals  in  the  budget
approval stage, and strict implementation of the budget.
Regarding the methodology, a wide literature of outstanding econometric studies
relating  to  the  political  business  cycles  in  developed  countries,  and  therefore  in  the
European Union countries, appeared. On the other hand, the econometric models are not
always  best  tools  when  analysing  the  political  business  cycles  in  Eastern  European
countries. That is because, in these countries, the democratic experience comprises only
three or four moments. Besides, the panel data regression models are not the appropriate
tools for political cycles analyses, because the great diversity of political conditions in
East European region.
Furthermore, in Eastern European countries incumbents have a variety of methods
as  a  mean  to  earn  votes:  increasing  real  minimum  wages,  pensions,  or  spending  on
popular programs such as health, education, social policy, and other current transfers.
Also,  governments  systematic  use  specific  public  investment  (such  as  spending  in
infrastructure) for diminishing unemployment. Therefore, a researcher looking for proves
of political business cycles in these countries by looking at  any single economic indicator
would have to conclude that the evidence is patchy. But if one implies in the analysis a
full range of available techniques, a clearer picture emerges – one in which pre-election
manipulation is far more evident and significant, and in which rational tradeoffs appear to
be made (Treisman and Gimpelson, 1999).
Another  important  subject  in  this  area  dwell  on  the  relationship  between  the
democracy  level, political  system  and economic  performance  in  Eastern  European
countries and therefore, in Romania too.
Even though a great deal of theoretical model treats the democracy level as an
exogenous  variable  from  both  economic  policy  and  economic  outcomes,  it  might  be
argued that the social process shaping a country's political structure and institutions may
be influenced by its economic conditions (Gonzalez, 2000). Moreover, no consensus has
been reached in the literature regarding the direction of the causality between democracy
and  economic  performance  (Drazen,  2000).  Political  and  economic  processes  tend  to
develop quickly in Eastern European countries, including in Romania. This is why one
could  expect    an  immediate  effect  of  economic  policy  on  a  country's  degree  of
democracy. As well, it is reasonable to believe that the effect of the economic conditions
over the political environment might be observed, even if the upshot requires some delay.
The democratisation process generates two opposite forces affecting the size of
the election cycle in public spending (Gonzales, 2000, p.23 -24): as the cost of enforcing
the  political  turnover  diminishes,  competent  governments  are  enticed  to  increase  the
magnitude of the visible component of the government spending before the election to
improve their re-election chances, and as the higher level of democracy increases the
degree  of  transparency  (i.e.  the  voters'  chances  to  learn  the  true  value  of  the  office -
holder's  competence),  the  political  cycle  is  attenuated.  Regarding  political  system,
Gonzales affirm that:
The  democratisation  process  has  magnified  the  risk  for  the  government  to  lose
power, but has not increased the country's transparency rapidly enough to r educe43
the  incumbent's  temptation  to  engage  in  opportunistic  policy -making  (Gonzales,
2000, p.4-5).
The Duch's analysis (Duch, 1999) enforces the Gonzales' conclusion: "It is widely
accepted that even in new democracies there exists a strong correlation be tween economic
perceptions and political outcomes. This is the basis for both championing democracy as
an appropriate set of political institutions but it is also, paradoxically, a constraint on the
implementation  of  painful  economic  reforms  (…)  Segments  o f  the  population  with
information shortfalls and with low levels of democratic satisfaction respond to economic
performance in a systematically different fashion than the informed and those satisfied
with democracy. The poorly informed and the democratic cynics are less likely to reward
(or punish) incumbents for good  (or bad) economic performance. As citizens in new
democracies  become  more  informed  about  political  and  economic  institutions  and
processes and as their satisfaction with the performance of dem ocratic institutions rises,
support for incumbent political parties becomes more sensitive to economic performance"
(Duch, 1999, p.23). These results suggest that:
(…)  imperfect  democracy  might  have  its  advantages.  In  particular,  imperfect
information  and democratic  dissatisfaction  might  facilitate  the  simultaneous
introduction  of  democratic  institutions  and  market  reform.  Incumbents  in  young
democracies are less likely to be judged on the basis of the economy's performance.
As information levels rise, and citizens become more satisfied with the performance
of democratic institutions, incumbents are more likely to be judged on the basis of
the economy's performance. This suggests that the early introduction of potentially
painful economic reforms is optimal for new democracies (Duch 1999, p.24).
For  Romania,  the  above  analysis  (see  section  5)  suggests  that,  probably,    a
certain degree of correlation exist between the political behaviour of the politicians in
office  and  macroeconomic  evolution.  Because  the reform  is  usually  accompanied  by
unpopular effects, the speed of reform' progression is smaller in electoral years. But, the
Romanian  electorate  didn't  react  according  to  opportunistic  political  business  cycles
theory: the electoral support for political parties was partisan, so that the improvement of
the economic conditions immediately before election was not accompanied by increase of
electoral support for the party in office.
The regional analysis confirms the hypothesis of a  significant correlation b etween
the  status  of  the  economy  and  political  behaviour  of  the  electors.  The  level  and  the
dynamic of the unemployment at regional level have an influence on vote behaviour, as in
the partisan political business cycle theory: in the zones with a higher un employment rate
there is a voting preference (tendency) towards the political left side.
This  conclusion  is  interesting  in  political  perspective.  If  the  unemployment
electors  carried  their  votes  toward  left,  the  PDSR'  reform  built  between  1992 -1996
resulted in a diminishing the electoral support for this party: during this period, the global
unemployment rate decreased from 8.2% (at the end of 1992) to 6.6% (at the end of
1996). Moreover, if the hypothesis concerning the partisan electorate behaviour is co rrect,
then the employers, the private entrepreneurs and the self -employed vote toward right-
wing parties. That means that electoral support for PDSR was also reduced  by another
result of the reform, namely the strong increase in the number of registered companies
(large numbers of them are limited liability companies).
A political analogous situation was recorded during the 1996 -2000 legislature.
The  global  unemployment  rate  increased  and  the  business  environment  became44
unfavourable,  leading  to  a  decrease  of  the  electoral  support  for  the  right-wing
governmental coalition (CDR).
According to these results, I agree to an optimistic idea like the one of Hallenberg
and Souza (2000, p.18):
There  are  no  reasons  to  believe  that  the  political  business  cycles  as   they  are
currently shaped in the Eastern European Countries, including in Romania, should
lead to any delays in the integration process to the European Union.
7. Bibliography
7.1. Topic: General Literature on the Theory of Political Business Cycles
Alesina A., 1987, Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game, in
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102: 651-678
Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G.D., 1997, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT
Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts, London – England.
Alt  J.,  1985, Political  Parties,  World  Demand,  and  Unemployment:  Domestic  and
International Sources of Economic Activity, in American Political Science Review
79: 1016-1040.
Barro R., Gordon D., 1983, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of M onetary
Policy, in Lournal of Monetary Economics, 12:101-22.
Berganza J.-C., 1998, Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A
Review Essay, CEMFI, Working Paper No. 9809, December.
Cukierman G., Meltzer A., 1986, A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of
Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution , in Economic Inquiry,
24: 367-388.
Downs A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row: NY
Drazen A., 2000, The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, Working paper, University
of Maryland, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and NBER, May
Frey B., 1996, Political Business Cycles,  Aldershot: Edgar Elgar.
Frey B., Schneider F., 1978, A Model of Politico-Economic Behaviour in the UK, in The
Economic Journal, pp. 243-53.
Frey B., Schneider F., 1978, An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the
United States, in Review of Economics and Statistics, 60:  174-183.
Gaertner M., 1994, Democracy, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy; Two Decades of
Progress, in European Journal of Political Economy, 10: 85-110.
Garratt  D.,  1996, Political  business  cycles –  a  survey,  Working  paper,  Leicester
University45
Garratt D., and Jackson P.M., 1996, Political business cycles: A literature survey, in
Discussion  Papers in  Public  Sector  Economics,  PSERC,  Department  of
Economics, University of Leicester, January, 96/2.
Hibbs D., 1977, Political parties and macroeconomic policy, in The American Political
Science Review, 71: 1467-1487.
Hibbs D., A., 1992, Partisan theory after fifteen years, in European Journal of Political
Economy 8: 361-373.
Jula D., Jula N., 2000, Political Business Cycles. An Overview, in Romanian Economic
Research Observer, 1:6-14, Romanian Academy.
Kalecki M., 1943, Political aspects of full employment, in Political Quarterly, 14: 322-
331.
Kydland  F.,  Prescott  E.,  1977, Rules  Rather  than  Discretion:  The  Inconsistency  of
Optimal Plans, in Journal of Political Economy, 85:473-90.
Leertouwer E., Maier P., 1999, Who Creates Political Business Cycles? (Should Central
Banks  Be  Blamed?),  Working  Paper,  University  of  Groningen,  Faculty  of
Economics, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Lindbeck  A.,  1976, Stabilization  Policies  in  Open  Economies  with  Endogenous
Politicians, in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1-19.
MacRae  D.,  1977, A  political  model  of  the  business  cycles,  in ournal  of  political
Economy, 85 (2), pp.239-263
Nannestad P., Paldam M., 1994, The VP-Function: A Survey of Literature on Vote and
Popularity Functions after 25 Years, in Public Choice 79, 213-245.
Nannestad P., Paldam M., 1997, The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited. A micro study of
economic voting in Denmark, 1986-92, in European Journal of Political Economy
13 (1): 81-99.
Nannestad  P.,  Paldam  M.,  1999. The  Cost  of  Ruling.  A  Foundation  Stone  for  Two
Theories,  Working  Paper  19/5,  Department  of  Economics,  Aarhus  University,
Denmark
Nordhaus W., 1975, The political business cycle, in Review of Economic Studies, April,
42: 169-190.
Nordhaus W., 1989, Alternative Models to Political Business Cycles, in Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution, 2: 1-50.
Nowaihi  A.  (al-),  Garratt  D.,  1998, The  New  Political  Macroeconomics,  in CEPR
Discussion  Papers  in  Public  Sector  Economic s,  PSERC,  Department  of
Economics, University of Leicester, August 1998
Paldam  M.,  1979, Is  there  an  Electional  Cycle?  A  Comparative  Study  of  National
Accounts, in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 81 (2), 323-342, republished in
Steinar Strøm (ed), Measurement in Public Choice, MacMillan, London 1980 and
in  Bruno  S.  Frey, Political  Business  Cycles,  Readings  Series,  Edward  Elgar
Publishing Ltd., London 1998.
Paldam  M.,  1981, A  Preliminary  Survey  of  the  Theories  and  Findings  on  Vote  and
Popularity Functions, in European Journal of Political Research, 9 (2), 181-199.46
Paldam M., 1991, How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over
Four Decades, in: Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique
Lafay (Eds.), Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support , University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 9-32.
Paldam M., 1997, Political Business Cycles, cap. 16 in Mueller (ed.), Perspectives in
Public Choice. A Handbook, Cambridge UP: Cambridge, UK & NY.
Persson T., Tabellini G., 1990, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics, Chur,
Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Price S., 1998, Comment on "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle" , in British
Journal of Political Science v28, n1 (Jan, 1998):201-11.
Rogoff K., 1990, Equilibrium political budget cycles, in American Economic Review,
March, 80: 21-36.
Rogoff K., Sibert A., 1988, Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles, in Review of
Economic Studies, January, 55: 1-16
Schneider F., Frey B.S., 1988, Politico-Economic Models of Macroeconomic Policy: A
Review of the Empirical Evidence, in Thomas D. Willet (ed.), Political Business
Cycles, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Schultz  K.  1995, The  Politics  of  the  Political  Business  Cycle,  in British  Journal  of
Political Science 25(1):79-100.
Waller C.-J., 1992,  A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank ,
in Journal of Monetaty Economics 29: 411-428.
Waller C.-J., 1992,  A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank ,
in Journal of Monetaty Economics 29: 411-428.
7. 2. Topic: Empirical Studies Concerning the Political Business Cycles in the
European Union Countries
Alesina A., Cohen G.D., Roubini N., 1991,  Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in
OECD  Democracies, Working  Paper  No.  3830,  National  Bureau  of  Economic
Research Working Papers Series.
Alesina A., Roubini N., 1990,  Political Cycles in OECD Economies, Working Paper No.
3478, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers Series.
Alesina  A.,  Roubini  N.,  1992, Political  Cycles  in  OECD  Economies,  in Review  of
Economic Studies, 59, p.663-688.
Alesina  A.,  Summers  L.,  1993, Central  Bank  Independence  and  Macroeconomic
Performance, in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25:151-162.
Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G.D., 1997, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, The
MIT Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts, London-England.
Álvarez  R.,  M.,  Garrett  G.,  Lange  P.,  1991, Government  Partisanship,  Labor
Organization  and  Macroeconomic  Performance,  1967 -1984,  in   American
Political Science Review 85:539-56.47
Barro R., Gordon D., 1983, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary
Policy, in Lournal of Monetary Economics, 12:101-22.
Beck N., Katz J.,N., Alvarez M., Garrett G., Lange P., 1993, Government Partisanship,
Labor  Organization,  and  Macroeconomic  Performance:  A  Corrigendum ,  in
American Political Science Review 87:945-48.
Berger  H.,  Woitek  U.,  1997, Searching  for  political  business  cycles  in  Germany ,  in
Public Choice, 91, 179-197.
Boix C., 1998, Partisan governments and macroeconomic policies in OECD economies ,
Estudio/Working Paper 1998/122 June 1998, Center for Advanced Study in the
Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid,
Chang E.C.C., 2001, Government Spending, Electoral Incentives, and Electoral Policy
Cycles in Advanced Democracies, Working Paper, University of California, Los
Angeles, Department of Political Science, January (Paper prepared for Center for
Comparative Social Analysis 2001 Annual Comparativists’ Day )
Chappell H., W. (Jr.), Veiga L.G., 1999, Economics and Elections in Western Europe:
1960-1997,  Woking  Paper,  Department  of  Economics,  University  of  South
Carolina, Columbia SC 29208
Clark W.R., Reichert U.N., Lomas S.L., Parker K.L., 1998, International and domestic
constraints  on  political  business  cycles  in  OECD  economies ,  in International
Organization, 51 (1), 87-120.
Hallerberg M., Hagen (von) J., 1997, Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations and
Budget  Deficits  in  the  European  Union,  Working  Paper  No.  6341,  National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers Series.
Hibbs D., A., 1992, Partisan theory after fifteen years, in European Journal of Political
Economy 8: 361-373.
Kydland  F.,  Prescott  E.,  1977, Rules  Rather  than  Discretion:  The  Inconsistency  of
Optimal Plans, in Journal of Political Economy, 85:473-90.
Leertouwer E., Maier P., 1999, Who Creates Political Business Cycles? (Should Central
Banks  Be  Blamed?),  Working  Paper,  University  of  Groningen,  Faculty  of
Economics, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Nickell  S.,  1997, Unemployment  and  Labor  Market  Rigidities:  Europe  versus  North
America, in Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3):55-74.
Price S., 1998, Comment on "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle" , in British
Journal of Political Science v28, n1 (Jan, 1998):201-11.
Rattinger H., 1991, Unemployment and Elections in West Germany, in: Helmut Norpoth,
Michael  S.  Lewis-Beck,  and  Jean-Dominique  Lafay  (Eds.), Economics  and
Politics: The Calculus of Support, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 49-
62.
Schultz  K.  1995, The  Politics  of  the  Political  Business  Cycle,  in British  Journal  of
Political Science 25(1):79-100.
Veiga L.G., Chappell H., W. (Jr.), 2000, Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized
Democracies,  Woking  Paper,  Department  of  Economics,  University  of  South48
Carolina, Columbia SC 29208 (paper presented to 1999 European Public Cho ice
Society Meeting at the Technical University of Lisbon)
Waller C.-J., 1992,  A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank ,
in Journal of Monetaty Economics 29: 411-428
7.3. Topic: Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries
Ames A., 1987, Political Survival, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Bates R., 1988, Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa, in: Bates, R. (ed.),
Toward  a  Political  Economy  of  Development.  A  Rational  Choice  Perspective.
Berkeley, University of California Press
Block S., 1999, Political Business Cycles, Democratization and Economic Reform: The
Case of Africa, Tufts University, mimeo.
Borner S., Brunetti E., Weder B., 1996, Political Credibility and Economic Development,
New York:  St. Martin's Press, 1995.
Frey B., Eichenberger R., 1994, The Political Economy of Stabilization Programmes in
Developing Countries, in European Journal of  Political Economy, 10: 169-190
Gonzalez  M.,  1999a, On  Elections,  Democracy  and  Macroeconomic  Policy  Cycles.
Evidence from Mexico, Princeton University, Department of Economics. Mimeo
Gonzalez M., 1999b, Political Budget Cycles and Democracy: a Multi-Country Analysis,
Princeton University, Department of Economics. Mimeo.
Gonzalez  M.,  2000a, On  Elections,  Democracy  and  Macroeconomic  Policy  Cycles,
Princeton University, Department of Economics. Mimeo
Gonzalez  M.,  2000b, Do  Changes  in  Democracy  affect  the  Political  Budget  Cycle?
Evidence from Mexico, Princeton University, September 2000 (manuscript)
Khemani S., 1999, Effect of Electoral Accountability on Economic Policy in India , The
World Bank, Development Research Group, Mimeo.
Khemani S., 2000, Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: effect of elections in the
Indian States, The World Bank, Development Research Group, Mimeo.
Kraemer  M.,  1997, Electoral  Budget  Cycles  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean:
Incidence,  Causes  and  Political  Futility,  Inter-American  Development  Bank
Working Paper, Washington, D.C.
Krueger  A.O.,  1992, Economic  Policy  Reform  in  Developing  Countries.  Oxford:
Blackwell.
Krueger  A.O.,  1993, Political  Economy  of  Policy  Reform  in  Developing  Countries ,
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Krueger A.O., Turan I., 1993, The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reform in
the  1980s,  in  Bates,  R.  and  Krueger,  A.O.  (eds.), Political  and  Economic
Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Evidence from Eight Countries , Oxford:
Blackwell.49
Magaloni  B.,  2000, Institutions,  Political  Opportunism  and  Macroeconomic  Cycles:
Mexico 1970-1998, Stanford University (manuscript).
Magloire F., 1997, Political Monetary Cycles and Independence of the Central Bank in a
Monetary Union: an Empirical Test for a BEAC Franc Zone Member Countryll ,
Journal of African Economies 6, 112-132.
Rojas-Suárez L., Cañonero G., Talvi E., 1998, Economics and Politics in Latin America:
Will Up-Coming Elections Compromise Stability and Reform? , Global Emerging
Markets Research, Deutsche Bank Securities, August.
Schuknecht  L.,  1996, Political  Business  Cycles  and  Fiscal  Policies  in  Developing
Countries, Kyklos 49, 155-170.
Schuknecht L., 1998a, Fiscal Policy Cycles and the Exchange Regime in Developing
Countries, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Analysis Division,
Staff Working Paper ERAD-97-04
Schuknecht L., 1998b, Fiscal Policy Cycles and the Public Expenditure in Developing
Countries, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Analysis Division,
Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-06
Schuknecht L., 2000, Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries ,
in Public Choice 102: 115–130, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Sen K., Vaidya R.R., 1996, Political Budget Cycles in India, Economic and Political
Weekly, July.
Shi M., Svensson J., 2000, Conditional Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence ,
in Political Business Cycles in Developed and Developing Countries, 7
th Annual
Conference  W.Allen  Wallis,  Institute  of  Political  Economy,  University  of
Rochester.
Shi M., Svensson J., 2001, Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ Between Developed
and Developing Countries?, Working Paper, IIES Stockholm University, January.
Treisman D., Gimpelson V., 1999, Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or
the Manipulations of "Chudar", in Dicussion Paper, CIRJE-F-39.
Whitehead  L.,  1990, Political  Explanations  of  Macroeconomic  Management ,  World
Development, Vol.18, Num.8.
7.4. Topic: Political Business Cycles in East European Transition Economies
Aghion Ph., Blanchard O.J., 1995, On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe, in:
Stanley  Fischer  and  Julio  Rotemberg  (Eds.), NBER  Macroeconomics  Annual
1994, Cambridge, MA, Nationa Bureau of Economic Research.
Avramov R., 1999, The Role of a Currency Board in Financial Crises: The Case of
Bulgaria, Discussion Papers, DP/6/1999, Bulgarian National Bank.
Bell J., 1997, Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns during the Economic Transition in
Poland, 1990-1995, Europe-Asia Studies 49, 1263-91.
Blanchard O.J., 1997, The Economics of Post-Communist Transition, Clarendon Lectures
in Economics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.50
Clark  W.,  Hallerberg  M.,  2000, Strategic  Interaction  between  Monetary  and  Fiscal
Actors under Full Capital Mobility, in American Political Science Review.
Cukierman Al., Tommasi M.,, 1998, When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China, in
American Economic Review.
Daviddi R., Ilzkovitz F., 1997, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Major
Challenges for Macro-economic Policies and Institutions of Central and Eastern
European Countries, in European Economic Review, pp. 671-680, n°41, 1997.
Dewatripont M., Roland G., 1996, Transition as a Process of Large-Scale Institutional
Change, in Economics of Transition 4 (1), 1-30.
Duch  R.,  1999, Information  Pre-requisites  to  Economic  Voting  in  Consolidating
Democracies,  paper  presented  in  the  Workshop  on  Political  Institutions:
Intermediaries Between Economics and Politics at the European Consortium of
Political Research, 1999 Meetings, Mannheim, Germany.
Earle J., Gehlbach S., Veèerník J., Šáková Z., 1997, Economic Reform, Attitudes and
Voting in the Czech Republic, Central European University, mimeo.
Fernandez R., Rodrik D., 1991, Resistance of Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of
Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155.
Fidrmuc J., 1996, Political Sustainability of Economic Reforms: Dynamics and Analysis
of Regional Economic Factors, CentER for Economic Research Discussion Paper
No. 9674., Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Fidrmuc  J.,  2000, Political  support  for  reforms:  Economics  of  voting  in  transition
countries, in European Economic Review 44: 1491-1513
Fidrmucova J., 1998, Restructuring in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: A Comparative
Empirical Study, Tilburg University, mimeo.
Hallenberg  M.,  Souza  L.-V.,  2000, The  Political  Business  Cycles  in  EU  Accession
Countries, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI-2000-085/2
Hayo B., 2000, Micro and macro Determinants of Public support for Market reforms in
Eastern Europe, Working paper B-25/1999, Zentrum für Europäische Integrations
forschung  (Center  for  European  Integration  Studies),  Rheinische  Friedrich -
Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Jackson  J.E.,  Klich  J.,  Poznanska  K.,  1996, Democratic  Institutions  and  Economic
Reform: The Polish Case, University of Michigan, mimeo.
Lafay J.-D., 1981, Empirical Analysis of Politico-Economic Interaction in East European
Countries, Soviet Studies 33, July 1981, 386-400.
Matejù  P.,  Øehaková  B.,  1996, Turning  Left  or  Class  Realignment?  Analysis  of  the
Changing Relationship between Class and Party in the Czech Republic, 1992 -
1996, mimeo, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences.
Münich  D.,  Šorm  V.,  1995, Socio-economic  Background  of  Voting  Behavior  in
Transition, CERGE-EI, Prague, mimeo.
Nannestad P., Paldam M., 1994, The VP-Function: A Survey of Literature on Vote and
Popularity Functions after 25 Years, in Public Choice 79, 213-245.51
Pacek  A.C.,  1994, Macroeconomic  Conditions and  Electoral  Politics  in  East  Central
Europe, in American Journal of Political Science 38, 723-44.
Rodrik  D.,  1995, The  Dynamics  of  Political  Support  for  Reforms  in  Economies  in
Transition, in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 9, 403-25.
Rodrik  D.,  1995, Understanding  Economic  Policy  Reform,  in Journal  of  Economic
Literature 34, 9-41.
Stolojan  Th.,  2000, Policy  Making  in  Romania,  in Romania  2000 –  10  Years  of
Transition. Past, Prezent and Future, conference proceedings, Octomber, World
Bank and Romanian Center for Economic Policy
Williamson J. (ed.), 1994, The Political Economy of Policy Reform, Washington: Institute
for International Economics.
Wolf Th., Havrylyshyn O., 1999, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries, in
Finance & Development, IMF.
7.5. Topic: The Political Business Cycles in Romania
Alesina A., Roubini N., Cohen G.D., 1997, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT
Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts, London – England.
Berganza J.-C., 1998, Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A
Review Essay, CEMFI, Working Paper No. 9809, December.
Cohen G.,D., 1993, Pre- and Post-Electoral Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Ph.D. diss.,
Harvard University.
Cukierman G., Meltzer A., 1986, A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of
Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution , in Economic Inquiry,
24: 367-388.
Daviddi R., Ilzkovitz F., 1997, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Major
Challenges for Macro-economic Policies and Institutions of Central and Eastern
European Countries, in European Economic Review, pp. 671-680, n°41, 1997.
Drazen A., 2000, The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, Working paper, University
of Maryland, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and NBER, May
Fidrmuc J., 1996, Political Sustainability of Economic Reforms: Dynamics and Analysis
of Regional Economic Factors, Working paper, CentER for Economic Research
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Fidrmuc  J.,  2000, Political  support  for  reforms:  Economics  of  voting  in  transition
countries, European Economic Review 44, 1491-1513
Frey B., 1996, Political Business Cycles.  Aldershot: Edgar Elgar.
Gaertner M., 1994, Democracy, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy; Tw o Decades of
Progress, in European Journal of Political Economy, 10: 85-110.
Hallenberg  M.,  Souza  L.-V.,  2000, The  Political  Business  Cycles  in  EU  Accession
Countries, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI-2000-085/252
Hayo B., 2000, Micro and macro Determinants of Public support for Market reforms in
Eastern Europe, Working paper B-25/1999, Zentrum für Europäische Integrations
forschung  (Center  for  European  Integration  Studies),  Rheinische  Friedrich -
Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Jula D., Jula N., 2000a, Political Business Cycles. An Overview, in Romanian Economic
Research Observer, 1:6-14, Romanian Academy.
Jula D., Jula N., 2000b, Political Business Cycle in Romania, in Romanian Economic
Research Observer, 4:6-25, Romanian Academy (forthcoming).
Jula D., Jula N., 2000c, Economic Signals of Political Behaviour in Romania , in The
Economy of Development, Proceeding papers, The International Conference of
Financial-Accounting  and  Administrative  Management  Faculty,  Bucharest
Ecological University, Bucharest, 4-5 April.
Jula  D.,  Jula  N.,  2000d, Analiza economică  a comportamentului  politic ,  Simpozionul
ştiinţific Reformele  economice  în  Republica  Moldova  şi  în  România ,  25-29
sept.2000, Academia de Studii Economice Chişinău, Republica Moldova.
Nannestad P., Paldam M., 1994, The VP-Function: A Survey of Literature on Vote and
Popularity Functions after 25 Years, in Public Choice 79, 213-245.
Nannestad P., Paldam, M., 1997, The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited. A micro study of
economic voting in Denmark, 1986-92, in European Journal of Political Economy
13 (1): 81-99.
Nannestad  P.,  Paldam  M.,  1999. The  Cost  of  Ruling.  A  Foundation  Stone  for  Two
Theories,  Working  Paper  19/5,  Department  of  Economics,  Aarhus  University,
Denmark
Pacek  A.C.,  1994, Macroeconomic  Conditions and  Electoral  Politics  in  East  Central
Europe, in American Journal of Political Science 38, 723-44.
Paldam M., 1997, Political Business Cycles, cap. 16 in Mueller (ed.), Perspectives in
Public Choice. A Handbook, Cambridge UP: Cambridge, UK & NY.
Persson T., Tabellini G., 1990, Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics, Chur,
Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Rodrik  D.,  1995, The  Dynamics  of  Political  Support  for  Reforms  in  Economies  in
Transition, in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies  9, 403-25.
Shi M., Svensson J., 2001, Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ Between Developed
and Developing Countries?, Working Paper, IIES Stockholm University, January.
Stolojan  Th.,  2000, Policy  Making  in  Romania,  in Romania  2000 –  10  Years  of
Transition. Past, Prezent and Future, conference proceedings, Octomber, World
Bank and Romanian Center for Economic Policy
Wolf Th., Havrylyshyn O., 1999, Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries, in
Finance & Development, IMF.53
7.6. Topic: Policy relevance
Alesina A., Hausmann R., Hommes R., Stein E., 1995, Budget institutions and fiscal
performance in Latin America,  Mimeo (quoted in Schuknecht L., 2000, Fiscal
policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries , in Public Choice
102: 115–130, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p.126).
Campos  E.,    Pradhan  S.,  1996, The  Impact  of  Budgetary  Institutions  on  Expenditure
Outcomes, Washington D.C.: World Bank PR Workink Paper no. 1646.
Chang E.C.C., 2001, Government Spending, Electoral Incentives, and Electoral Policy
Cycles in Advanced Democracies, Working Paper, University of California, Los
Angeles, Department of Political Science, January (Paper prepared for Center for
Comparative Social Analysis 2001 Annual Comparativists’ Day).
Clark W.R., Reichert U.N., Lomas S.L., Parker K.L., 1998 , International and domestic
constraints  on  political  business  cycles  in  OECD  economies ,  in International
Organization, 51 (1), 87-120.
Drazen  A.,  2000, Political  economy  in  macroeconomics,  Princeton  University  Press,
Princeton, New Jersey.
Duch  R.,  1999, Information  Pre-requisites  to  Economic  Voting  in  Consolidating
Democracies,  paper  presented  in  the  Workshop  on  Political  Institutions:
Intermediaries Between Economics and Politics at the European Consortium of
Political Research, 1999 Meetings, Mannheim, Germany.
Gonzalez  M.,  2000, Do  Changes  in  Democracy  affect  the  Political  Budget  Cycle?
Evidence from Mexico, Princeton University, September 2000 (manuscript)
Hagen (von) J., Harden I., 1994, National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance , in
European Union  Reports  and  Studies  "Towards  Greater  Fiscal  Discipline" ,
Brussels.
Hallenberg  M.,  Souza  L.-V.,  2000, The  Political  Business  Cycles  in  EU  Accession
Countries, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI-2000-085/2.
Hallerberg M., von Hagen J., 1998, Electoral Institutions and the Budget Process, in
Democracy,  Decentralisation  and  Deficits  in  Latin  Americ a,  Fukasaku,  K.  &
Hausmann, R. (eds.), OECD, pp. 65-94.
Hallerberg  M.,  von  Hagen  J.,  1999, Electoral  Institutions,  Cabinet  Negotiations,  and
Budget  Deficits  within  the  European  Union,  in Fiscal  Institutions  and  Fiscal
Performance, Poterba, J. & von Hagen, J. (eds.), University of Chicago Press, pp.
209-232.
Khemani S., 2000, Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: effect of elections in the
Indian States, The World Bank, Development Research Group, Mimeo.
Leertouwer E., Maier P., 1999, Who Creates Political Business Cycles? (Should Central
Banks  Be  Blamed?),  Working  Paper,  University  of  Groningen,  Faculty  of
Economics, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Price  S.,  1998,  Comment  on  'The  Politics  of  the  Political  Business  Cycle,  in British
Journal of Political Science, 28, no.1 (Jan.):201-1154
Schuknecht L., 1998, Fiscal Policy Cycles and the Public Expenditure in Developing
Countries, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Analysis Division,
Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-06.
Schuknecht L., 2000, Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries ,
in Public Choice 102: 115–130, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Schultz  K.,  1995, The  Politics  of  the  Political  Business  Cycle,  in British  Journal  of
Political Science, 25(1):79-100.
Tanzi V., Schuknecht L., 1997, Government reform: The recent experience, in European
Journal of Political Economy 13: 395–417.
Treisman D., Gimpelson V., 1999, Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or
the Manipulations of "Chudar", in Dicussion Paper, CIRJE-F-39.